Growing into citizenship: the differential role of the media in the political socialization of adolescents by Möller, Judith
  
 
 
 
 
 
GROWING INTO CITIZENSHIP: THE DIFFERENTIAL ROLE OF THE 
MEDIA IN THE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF ADOLESCENTS. 
 
 
ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT 
 
 
door 
Judith Möller 
  
2 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 3 
Chapter 2 The differential role of the media as an agent of political 
socialization in Europe 
22 
Chapter 3 Spiral of political learning. The reciprocal relationship of news 
media use and political knowledge among adolescents 
51 
Chapter 4 Pathway to political participation: The influence of online and 
offline news media on internal efficacy and turnout of first time 
voters. 
75 
Chapter 5 Casting a Political Idol? A TV Casting Show for a Political 
Party and Its Effects on Adolescents 
94 
Chapter 6 General conclusion 121 
Appendix  138 
3 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
“Tuned out” (Mindich, 2005) and “alienated” (Henn & Weinstein, 2006) these are just 
two of the labels scientists, journalists and politicians have put on the youngest generation of 
citizens. According to many of these voices, young adults are less engaged in politics than 
ever before. This claim can be supported by numbers: In the US only 26% of university 
freshmen think that politics is important (Galston, 2001) compared to 58% in 1966, and less 
and less adolescents follow political information in the media (Patterson, 2007). In Europe, 
similar evidence can be found. Electoral participation of the young is dwindling (Dalton, 
2006), in Germany, adolescents are less likely to join in political parties (Niedermayer, 2006) 
or even develop a preference for one (Mößner, 2006). Henn and Weinstein (2006) observe a 
comparable alienation from politics in the UK among the young. 
This development is a serious threat to democracy. A democratic political system 
cannot function without a demos, an active citizenry that cares and participates. This is 
because any democratic system depends upon legitimization through its citizens, through 
voting and by participating in politics. Yet, the youngest generation of citizens in Western 
democracies is growing up disengaged or even alienated from the political world – and are 
likely to remain so throughout their lives (Sears & Valentino, 1997).  
In this context it is important to consider the role of the media to understand why so 
many adolescents are socialized in a way that leaves them feeling like they have no part in the 
political system today. First, because media play a prominent role in the lives of adolescents. 
In Europe 93% of adolescents use the Internet every single day, and 95% watch TV on a daily 
basis (European Social Survey). Children and adolescents aged 8 to 18 use media over 8 
hours a day (Foehr & Roberts, 2010). Second, because media can be – depending on content 
and the way they are used – a benefit or a curse for the process of political socialization. On 
the one hand media are a place where adolescents can seek out or be exposed to political 
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information, discuss issues or even participate, for example by signing online petitions. On 
the other hand, media use takes up a great share of their time that could have been used for 
community service or other activities known to foster positive attributes of citizenship 
(Putnam, 2000). Additionally, some media content, for example highly strategic political 
information that portrays politics as a game of egoistic power players, might even be 
detrimental to the development of positive political attitudes. It is important to note that media 
is understood in the broadest sense here; the term includes traditional media sources like TV, 
newspapers and the radio as well as online news sources or participatory online media like 
social network sites. 
Given the significance of the issue, the literature on the differential effects of media 
use on political socialization is relatively thin (Delli Carpini, 2004), in particular with regard 
to long-term effects. Since the pioneering work of Chaffee and colleagues in the 1970s (for an 
overview see Chaffee & Yang, 1990) only few scholars have investigated the influence of 
media on political socialization over a longer period of time, for example the research groups 
of McLeod, Shah, and others (McLeod, Shah, Hess, & Lee, 2010) and Hooghe and colleagues 
(for an overview see Hooghe, 2012). Yet, the world of political socialization has changed 
considerably since Chaffee and colleagues published their work during the heyday of political 
socialization research in the 1970s (Sapiro, 2004). Therefore an update of our knowledge of 
the phenomenon is needed. 
Changing agents and processes of political socialization. Past research often singled 
out parental influence as the main driving force of political socialization (for example Hess & 
Torney, 1967), yet recent studies find parental influence to be close to insignificant (Lee, 
Shah, & McLeod, 2012). This is due to a fundamental transformation of the political culture 
in the past decades. Party alignments have weakened and political cynicism is generally on 
the rise (Hetherington, 2005). Hence, if parents have distanced themselves from politics, they 
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cannot serve as political role models in the way they used to anymore. At the same time social 
movements like the anti-globalization movement have entered the playing field and act as 
independent agents of socialization, motivating young and old to become engaged in often 
short-lived issue oriented initiatives (Norris, 2003).  
Changing media system. A second factor that has changed over the past decades is the 
media system. Here, in particular two developments are important. First, political information 
has changed in content. The news is increasingly entertainment oriented and focuses on 
persons rather than issues. This development can be related to the general growth in apathy 
towards politics, mentioned above (Wirth, 2000). Second, the Internet has become an integral 
part of our everyday lives, especially for the young. Whereas the advent of online media has 
first been regarded as a threat to political socialization (for an overview see Shah, McLeod, & 
Yoon, 2001), the academic debate concerning the potency of the Internet for the political 
socialization of the young now focuses on its opportunities (Coleman, 2008).  
Research question 
Given all these developments, we are in need of an update of our understanding of the 
processes and mechanisms of political socialization in particular with regard to the role of the 
media. The key question is how media influence the development of political knowledge, 
political attitudes, and political participation today, given that the role of other agents of 
socialization has changed.  
It is the aim of this dissertation to contribute to the understanding of the media‟s role 
in the political socialization process of adolescents by focusing on a few key aspects 
characterizing the media landscape in the 21
st
 century: a) the advent of online media as a 
regular source of information on the one hand and an interactive platform enabling political 
discussion and engagement on the other; b) the dynamics of media influence, acknowledging 
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that the causal relationship of media use and outcome variables of political involvement is 
interdependent, and c) differential effects of specific content and different media types. 
Growing into democratic citizenship 
The concept of political socialization has been thoroughly debated in the social 
sciences. In 1959 Hyman defined it as a person‟s “learning of social patterns corresponding to 
his societal position as mediated through various agencies of society” (p.25). Scholars of 
social sciences still broadly accept this definition; however, the political aspect of political 
socialization remains relatively vague by this definition. Sigel (1965) suggests defining it as 
“the process by which persons learn to adopt the norms, values, attitudes, and behaviors 
accepted and practiced by the ongoing (political) system” (p.1). This definition is useful 
because it specifies the areas in which political socializations takes place: norms, values, 
attitudes and behaviors. The definition also makes clear that political socialization is a 
normative process – citizens are shaped within a specific political system.  
However, from today‟s perspective Sigel‟s definition can be criticized for a number of 
reasons: First, the individual is regarded as a passive object upon which norms, values, 
attitudes and behaviors are imposed. Yet, recent theorizing clearly shows that we are active 
participants in our own political socialization (Sears & Levy, 2003), by seeking out 
information about politics, negotiating its meaning and choosing the political experiences we 
want to participate in. Second, Sigel‟s definition neglects the notion of agents that mediate the 
political socialization process, which is a part of Hyman‟s definition. Agents of political 
socialization are, for example, parents, peers, teachers, but also the media. Finally, Sigel‟s 
definition describes a developmental process with a static outcome, whereas political 
socialization is now understood as a life-long process in which political cognitions, affects, 
norms and behaviors are constantly evaluated and potentially adapted as the political system 
changes around them (Sears & Levy, 2003). That being said, within this life long process, 
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adolescence plays a pivotal role, as it marks the period in life in which individuals face their 
first electoral decision. Moreover policy decisions, the outcome of the political system, gain 
relevance when adolescents become increasingly independent of their parents. I therefore 
define political socialization as a life-long process in which individuals acquire knowledge, 
norms, values and behaviors relevant to the ongoing political system. This process is mediated 
by various agents, one of which is the media. 
Studying political socialization among adolescents 
As mentioned above, adolescence is a pivotal period in life with regard to the process 
of political socialization. Children already become familiar with aspects of the political 
system as early as the age of six (van Deth, Abendschön, & Vollmar, 2010), but their 
understanding of the complex interplay of political institutions that characterizes politics 
remains superficial. During childhood parents are the prime agent of political socialization. 
By demonstrating what it means to be a citizen as well as discussing politics they can spark 
children‟s first interest in politics (Chaffee, McLeod, & Atkin, 1971). As children grow into 
adolescence, however, parental influence becomes less and less important and peers and 
teachers enter the playing field as important agents of political socialization. Again, 
conversations about politics are the key environment in which political socialization takes 
place. To give an example, classroom debates in which students take on a pre-determined 
standpoint on an issue and defend it, are proven to be a very efficient tool to foster political 
participation (Shah, McLeod, & Lee, 2009).  
During late adolescence and early adulthood the life of many young citizens changes 
drastically. As they graduate from secondary school and start a working life or continue their 
studies elsewhere, their social environment changes. Teachers and friends from school loose 
influence and media takes their place to a large extends as the prime source of political 
information and agent of political socialization. It is important to note that changes in 
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importance as agents of socialization are different from individual to individual and a gradual 
process. This also implies that several agents play a role in the socialization process at the 
same time. This is why it is so crucial to study exactly adolescence as a period in life with 
regard to media effects on political socialization. We need to understand how adolescents are 
influenced by the media and whether or not these processes function for all adolescents in the 
same way. 
There is an additional reason why adolescence is especially interesting to study in the 
context of political socialization. During late adolescence young citizens are eligible to take 
their first electoral decisions. The decision to turn out or not in the first two elections highly 
correlation with turnout later in life (Sears & Levy, 2003; Franklin, 2004). At the same time, 
young citizens also increasingly face the effects of policy decisions taken by the government. 
They start to pay taxes or are enrolled in the educational system, which is subject to 
government regulation. This means that politics become a relevant factor in their lives, the 
question is whether they want to be a part of it or not. 
Analytical model 
In this dissertation I focus on three areas of political socialization: the development of 
political knowledge, political attitudes and political participation. In the following section 
each of these outcome variables will be discussed in the context of potential media effects. 
Figure 1.1 presents a simplified model of all causal processes investigated. 
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Figure 1.1: Analytical model of media influence on political socialization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is important to note that the mechanisms of media effects should not be understood 
as a simple stimulus-response process. In fact effects of media on variables of political 
socialization should be understood as reciprocal and conditional upon a number of 
characteristics on the individual level (Valkenburg & Peter, 2013). I will briefly describe each 
of the key elements and connections from Figure 1.1. 
 
Political knowledge 
Although the development of political knowledge is not explicitly included in Sigel‟s 
influential list of areas of political socialization it is key to the cultivation of democratic 
citizens. In order to take informed decisions and participate, citizens need a basic 
understanding of political structures and processes (structural political knowledge) as well as 
an overview of current issues at stake, key players, and ongoing political debates (factual 
political knowledge). Media use, in particular news use, can contribute to political learning 
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with regard to both dimensions of political knowledge – by presenting information on current 
events and thereby demonstrating the political process. However, political learning through 
news media is not a straightforward stimulus-response reaction, because it is conditional upon 
a number of factors, among which already existing political knowledge. Therefore the causal 
relationship of news use and political knowledge is best conceptualized as a mutually 
interdependent spiral (see chapter 3).  
Political attitudes 
Political attitudes, like political cynicism or political trust describe a cognitive-
affective perspective on the political system and its actors. Political attitudes are important 
determinants of political behavior (Hooghe & Quintelier, 2011). To illustrate this with an 
example: political cynicism has been found to have demobilizing effects on political 
participation (Valentino, Beckmann, & Buhr, 2001), although there is also evidence to the 
contrary (De Vreese & Semetko, 2002). However, let us use the example of political cynicism 
again to illustrate potential media effects on political attitudes. There is ample research on 
theorizing claiming that specific media content, for example conflict-framed news stories or 
coverage of political scandals, portrays the politics in an overly negative light. Exposure to 
this type of content gives the audience the impression that politics is a power game of egoistic 
players who are not concerned with their interests (see also Chapter 2). Additionally, effects 
of media content on cynicism are conditional upon characteristics of the media user as well as 
the context in which media is used (Schuck, Boomgaarden & de Vreese, 2013).  
Political behavior 
Political participation is investigated as an area of political socialization affected by 
media use. In this dissertation I explicitly choose to employ a broad conceptualization of 
political participation, thereby deviating from the majority of research on political 
participation that mainly focuses on electoral participation. My definition of political 
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participation includes all acts intended to influence the political system: from spraying a 
political message on a wall to engaging in a political campaign. I use this broad definition for 
three reasons. The first is of practical nature. Adolescents are only eligible to vote once they 
have reached voting age. Yet, the crucial phase of political socialization starts before they are 
allowed to vote for the first time. Hence other modes of participation need to be considered 
when studying change in participation at this age. The second argument is theory-driven. 
Democracy today is a complex process of negotiating interests. Citizens have ample 
opportunities to be part of the policy making process even during an electoral cycle. In 
particular through the advent of the Internet and its possibilities to connect with like-minded 
people (for example by starting an online petition), citizens can directly influence 
parliamentary decision making. Although most of these initiatives are not directly legally 
binding, they still put pressure on political actors to consider the people‟s will. Third, we need 
to consider new forms of participation to validly tap into the lifestyle of the youngest 
generation. Flexibility is a key characteristic of the young generation in their private as well 
as their professional lives. This also holds for their approach towards political participation, as 
Norris (2004) points out. Instead of aligning themselves with a political party, young people 
prefer to form short lived coalitions around one specific issue (for example to stop a study 
reform) that quickly dissolves once their goal is reached or the issue is off the political 
agenda. Therefore a multitude of political activities need to be considered to be able to 
investigate whether or not adolescents participate in politics. 
Turning to potential media effects on political participation, evidence so far is mixed. 
According to the literature, media has the power to mobilize and demobilize its audience – 
depending on characteristics of the user as well as the media source. For example, online 
media are likely to trigger different kind of political engagement than offline media (Vissers, 
Hooghe, Stolle, & Maheo, 2012). Entertainment media use, in particular regular use of 
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sitcoms, has been found to be negatively related to political participation (Holbert, Shah, & 
Kwak, 2003), whereas news media is likely to mobilize users. It is important to note that the 
causal relationship of these processes goes both ways. Additionally, there are two mediating 
factors between news use and political participation: conversations about politics with parents 
or peers and political efficacy. The first mediator, political talk, has been established in the 
work of McLeod, Shah and colleagues (2010). They demonstrated in multiple studies that 
exposure to news in the media among adolescents only inspires adolescents to participate in 
politics, if the information obtained is processed and evaluated through talking to family or 
friends. As I point out in Chapter 4 there is also a second mediating factor: political efficacy, 
to be specific: internal political efficacy or the feeling to be competent and informed enough 
to participate in the political process. The reason why internal efficacy mediates between 
political information use and participation is in line with the previous argument. Information 
needs to be processed in order to be effective. Once adolescents feel like they have 
understood what they have been exposed to, they feel competent enough to participate. 
Research design and data 
Two data sources 
To investigate the role of the media in political socialization of adolescents I rely on two data 
sources in this dissertation: the European Social Survey (ESS) and an originally collected 
four-wave survey. This second dataset was collected for the purpose of this study among a 
representative sample of 15 to 18 years olds in the Netherlands between 2010 and 2012. 
The ESS data set enables a comparative perspective of the phenomenon. The comparison I 
undertake in Chapter 2 is even twofold: First, adolescents all across Europe are compared to 
each other. Second, adolescents are compared to adults. The comparison of European 
adolescents has two advantages. First, it allows testing the influence of system-level factors, 
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such as the democratic performance of a country. Second, by studying 22
1
 countries at the 
same time I can find out whether media influence on political socialization is comparable in 
Europe, or whether it varies among different contexts. This helps to answer the question 
whether the causal mechanisms of media influence are conditional upon a specific type of 
political or media system. 
The second comparative perspective concerns potential differences in media effects on 
adolescents and adults. As explained above, the focus of this dissertation is media effects 
during adolescence, because this period is so crucial for the development of democratic 
citizens. As I choose to focus on one specific age group, I implicitly assume that the impact of 
media on adolescents is inherently different than on adults. It might be stronger, due to sheer 
amount of time adolescents spend with the media, but it might also be weaker as the media is 
just becoming an influential player in the formation of political knowledge, attitudes and 
behavior. Using ESS data in the second chapter enables me to test this assumption explicitly 
and find out whether there is in fact a difference in media effects between adults and 
adolescents. 
The four-wave panel survey was specifically designed for the purpose of this study in 
cooperation with our project partners Frank Esser and Ruth Kunz at the University of Zurich, 
who carried out a similar panel survey in Switzerland in the same time period. The survey was 
collected within the broader frame work of project IP10 as part of National Centre of 
Competence in Research (NCCR) democracy funded by the National Swiss Science 
Foundation. The data collection in the Netherlands was partly funded by NCCR and partly 
founded by the Amsterdam School of Communication Research.  
Using panel data to study political socialization is a worthwhile undertaking, as political 
socialization is a dynamic process that plays out over a long period of time. To study such a 
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process reliably it is crucial to analyze the phenomenon longitudinally. Instead of focusing on 
the level of political engagement or knowledge at a specific point in time, I am setting out to 
study growth or decline in the dependent variables and how changes in media use relate to 
either of them. This creates a more inclusive picture of the causal relationships at stake. A 
second advantage of using panel data over such an extended period of time is that I am able to 
depict a significant part of the adolescent political socialization trajectory. This implies that 
media effects observed in this study are long-term media effects that are likely to last longer 
than the study period of two and a half years, and certainly longer than media effects found in 
experimental studies. 
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire used to collect the data consists of 59 questions in the first 
measurement and 50 questions in the second and third measurement. The majority of 
questions asked in the questionnaire consisted of multiple items that were separately rated. 
Respondents took about 30 minutes on average to fill in the questionnaire during the first 
wave, and 25 minutes during the second and third wave. The final measurement was meant as 
a brief check-up after the elections and therefore only contained 5 questions. All 
questionnaires were administered online.  
The variables measured range from the dependent variables political engagement, 
political knowledge, and political attitudes to standard socio -demographic control variables 
like education and age. Other important control variables are parental and peer influence, 
political norms, and political experiences. The variable which was measured in most detail is 
the main independent variable in this dissertation: media use. The questionnaire contains a set 
of questions that tap into general media use and access to media (internet access at different 
locations, whether or not their parents are or were subscribed to a newspaper). Furthermore, a 
total of 27 news outlets – online, televised, or in print – were presented to the respondents. 
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For each of these outlets respondents reported their usage per days in a typical week. 
Moreover, I collected data on their online activities, how attentive they used the news, and on 
their interpersonal communication about politics. 
Sample 
The survey was carried out by the Dutch opinion institute Gfk, which also provided 
the sample. To arrive at a sample representative for the population (Dutch adolescents 15 to 
18 years old at the beginning of the survey), a light quota sample was drawn from their 
database, which is representative of the Dutch population. The quotas we applied were age 
(15 to 18), gender, and education. For specifics on each measurement see Table 1. 
Table 1.1: Fieldwork data per wave 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 
N 1653 1186 888 746 
Field period 6/16/2010 – 
7/10/2010 
6/16/2011 – 
7/10/2011 
6/14/2012 – 
7/3/2012 
9/14/2012 – 
9/24/2012 
Attrition rate  - 28% 25% 16% 
     
Panel attrition did not lead to a significant change in the composition of the panel with 
regard to key demographic variables age, gender, and education.  
Outline of this dissertation 
The empirical studies presented in the next chapters of this dissertation all contribute 
to answer the key question whether and how media use influences the process of political 
socialization. Therefore, each study investigates a different aspect of the analytical model 
introduced above, focusing on specific dependent variables and causal mechanisms. The line 
of arguing in this dissertation leads from broad to specific. Whereas I analyze very general 
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effects of media use in the first study, the last study investigates the effects of a specific TV 
program, which was specifically designed to reach and mobilize the youth. 
As mentioned above Chapter 2 is based on data of the European Social Survey and 
serves the purpose of placing the subsequent studies into context. In this study I zoom into the 
subject by comparing Dutch adolescents, the group investigated in chapters 3 to 5, in two 
ways: by looking at multiple political and media systems and comparing media effects on 
adults and adolescents within these systems. The main dependent variables in this study are 
political attitudes and political engagement. In this chapter the causal mechanisms is tested 
rather crudely, which is mainly a consequence of data constraints.  
The dynamics of the causal mechanism between political outcome variable and media 
use, however, is detailed in chapter 3, using the example of political knowledge. By relying 
on panel data and Structural Equation Modeling I provide evidence that the relationship 
between political knowledge and news media use is best described as a mutually reinforcing 
spiral. 
In Chapter 4 I disentangle the effect of different media sources. TV, print and Internet 
news are analyzed separately to find out whether one source is more influential than the other. 
In particular online media are in the focus of this study. I distinguish between traditional 
unidirectional news sources and interactive platforms allowing to discuss politics or even get 
engaged straight away. Moreover, I provide evidence that the causal mechanism between 
media use and political participation is mediated by internal political efficacy, the feeling that 
one is informed enough and capable to participate in the political process. 
In the final empirical chapter I take the argument beyond the status quo and analyze 
how a strategic design of a political information program can contribute to political 
mobilization of the young. The study investigates whether integrating content and stylistic 
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features in a political information program, which appeal to a young taste, can inspire the 
audience to become more active in the political world.  
  
18 
 
References 
Chaffee, S. H., McLeod, J. M., & Atkin, C. K. (1971). Parental Influences On Adolescent 
Media Use. American Behavioral Scientist, 14(3), 323-340. doi: 
10.1177/000276427101400304 
Chaffee, S. H., & Yang, S.-M. (1990). Communication and Political Socialization. In O. 
Ichilov (Ed.), Political Socialization, Citizenship Education, and Democracy (pp. 137-
157). New York, London: Teachers College Press. 
Coleman, S. (2008). Doing IT for Themselves: Management versus Autonomy in Youth E-
Citizenship. In W. L. Bennett (Ed.), Civic Life Online: Learning How Digital Media 
Can Engage Youth (pp. 189-206). Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
De Vreese, C. H., & Semetko, H. A. (2002). Cynical and Engaged: Strategic Campaign 
Coverage, Public Opinion, and Mobilization in a Referendum. Communication 
Research, 29(6), 615-641. doi: 10.1177/009365002237829 
Ferchhoff, W. (2007). Jugend und Jugendkulturen im 21. Jahrhundert: Lebensformen und 
Lebensstile. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
Franklin, M. N. (2004). Voter turnout and the dynamics of electoral competition in 
established democracies since 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Galston, W. A. (2001). Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic Education. 
Annual Review of Political Science, 4(1), 217-234. doi: 
doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.217 
Henn, M., & Weinstein, M. (2006). Young people and political (in)activism: why don't young 
people vote? Policy & Politics, 34, 517-534.  
Hess, R. D., & Torney, J. V. (1967). The development of political attitudes in children. New 
Brunswick, London: Aldine Transaction. 
19 
 
Hetherington, M. J. (2005). Why trust matters: Declining political trust and the demise of 
American liberalism: Princeton University Press. 
Holbert, R. L., Shah, D. V., & Kwak, N. (2003). Political Implications of Prime-Time Drama 
and Sitcom Use: Genres of Representation and Opinions Concerning Women's Rights. 
Journal of Communication, 53(1), 45-60.  
Hooghe, M. (Ed.). (2012). Jongeren, politiek en burgerschap. Leuven. 
Hooghe, M., & Quintelier, E. (2011). Political Attitudes and Political Participation:: A Panel 
Study on Socialization and Self-Selection Effects among Late Adolescents. 
International Political Science Review. doi: 10.1177/0192512111412632 
Lee, N.-J., Shah, D. V., & McLeod, J. M. (2012). Processes of Political Socialization: A 
Communication Mediation Approach to Youth Civic Engagement. Communication 
Research. doi: 10.1177/0093650212436712 
McLeod, D. M., Shah, D. V., Hess, D., & Lee, N.-J. (2010). Communication and education: 
creating competence for socialization into public life. In L. R. Sherrod, J. Torney-
Purta & C. A. Flanagan (Eds.), Handbook of civic engagement in youth (pp. 363-392). 
Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley & Sons. 
Mindich, D. (2005). Tuned Out. Why Americans under 40 Don't Follow the News. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Mößner, A. (2006). Jung und ungebunden? Parteiidentifikation von jungen Erwachsenen. In 
E. Roller, F. Brettschneider & J. W. V. Deth (Eds.), Jugend und Politik: "Voll 
normal!". Der Beitrag der politischen Soziologie zur Jugendforschung (pp. 269-291). 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Niedermayer, O. (2006). Jugend und Parteien. In E. Roller, F. Brettschneider & J. W. V. Deth 
(Eds.), Jugend und Politik: "Voll normal!". Der Beitrag der politischen Soziologie zur 
Jugendforschung (pp. 269-291). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
20 
 
Norris, P. (2003). Young People and Political Activism: From the Politics of Loyalities to the 
Politcs of Choice? Paper presented at the Council of Europe Symposium: Young 
People and Democratic Institutions: From Disillusionment to Participation, 
Strasbourg.  
Patterson, T. E. (2007). Young People and News: Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, 
Politics and Public Policy. John F. Kennendy School of Government, Harvard 
University. 
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling Alone : the Collapse and Revival of American Community. 
New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Sapiro, V. (2004). Not Your Parents' Political Socialization: Introduction for a New 
Generation. Annual Review of Political Science, 7(1), 1-23. doi: 
doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104840 
Schuck, A. R. T., Boomgaarden, H. G., & de Vreese, C. H. (2013). Cynics all around? the 
impact of election news on political cynicism in comparative perspective. Journal of 
Communication, 63(2), 287-311. 
Sears, D. O., & Levy, S. (2003). Childhood and Adult Political Development. In D. O. Sears, 
L. Huddy & R. Jervis (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (pp. 60-109). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sears, D. O., & Valentino, N. A. (1997). Politics Matters: Political Events as Catalysts for 
Preadult Socialization. The American Political Science Review, 91(1), 45-65.  
Shah, D. V., McLeod, J. M., & Lee, N. J. (2009). Communication Competence as a 
Foundation for Civic Competence: Processes of Socialization into Citizenship. 
Political Communication, 26(1), 102-117. doi: 10.1080/10584600802710384 
21 
 
Shah, D. V., McLeod, J. M., & Yoon, S. H. (2001). Communication, context, and community 
- An exploration of print, broadcast, and Internet influences. Communication 
Research, 28(4), 464-506.  
Valentino, N. A., Beckmann, M. N., & Buhr, T. A. (2001). A Spiral of Cynicism for Some: 
The Contingent Effects of Campaign News Frames on Participation and Confidence in 
Government. Political Communication, 18(4), 347-367.  
Valkenburg, P. M., & Peter, J. (2013). The differential susceptibility to media effects model. 
Journal of Communication, 63(2), 221-243.  
van Deth, J. W., Abendschön, S., & Vollmar, M. (2010). Children and Politics: An Empirical 
Reassessment of Early Political Socialization. Political Psychology, 32(1), 147-174.  
Vissers, S., Hooghe, M., Stolle, D., & Maheo, V.-A. (2012). The Impact of Mobilization 
Media on Off-Line and Online Participation: Are Mobilization Effects Medium-
Specific? Social Science Computer Review, 30(2), 152-169. doi: 
10.1177/0894439310396485 
Wirth, W. (2000). Infotainment. Chancen für politische Sozialisation Jugendlicher? In I. 
Haase, D. Schnatmeyer & C. Wegener (Eds.), Information, Emotion, Sensation. Wie 
im Fernsehen die Grenzen zerfliessen (pp. 62-91). Bielefeld: Gesellschaft für 
Medienpädagogik und Kommunikationskultur in der Bundesrepublik. 
 
22 
 
Chapter 2: The differential role of the media as an agent of political socialization in 
Europe 
 
This chapter was published in the European Journal of Communication
2
 
 
Abstract 
Declining political involvement of adolescents in Western society has caused wide 
concerns about the health of democracy in the future. This study investigates the role of the 
media in the formation of political attitudes and political mobilization of adolescents. Based 
on a secondary data analysis of the European Social Survey (n=5657), the influence of 
exposure to news and entertainment content on political trust, signing petitions, and consumer 
politics is assessed in a multi-level regression analysis. Additionally, the impact of the 
political and educational system on political attitude formation and civic engagement of 
adolescents is investigated. The results show a higher level of engagement in countries with a 
well-functioning democracy. At the individual level, news media exposure is positively 
related to engagement in consumer politics, whereas exposure to entertainment is negatively 
related to mobilization.   
                                                 
2
 Moeller, J., & de Vreese, C. (2013) The differential role of the media as an agent of political 
socialization in Europe. European Journal of Communication, 28(3), 309-325. doi: 10.1177/0267323113482447 
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The media, most notably television and the Internet, have a considerable impact on the 
lives and political development of adolescents. A teenager today spends on average 8 hours a 
day using media (Strasburger, Wilson, & Jordan, 2009). By doing so, he or she potentially 
learns about current events, becomes acquainted with the actors of the national and 
international political arena, and is introduced to expert evaluations (Graber, 1997). These are 
important ingredients of the socialization process towards becoming a political citizen. But 
this only happens if he or she chooses to do so in the abundance of choice in today‟s media 
landscape (see Prior, 2007). It is the aim of this chapter to investigate how and to what degree 
media influence the political socialization of adolescents.  
Young adults, their media use, and the potential consequences of the latter on their 
political preferences and behavior are frequently studied in the social sciences. However, 
most studies refrain from studying the phenomenon from a socialization perspective and 
differences in political attitudes between adolescents and adults are interpreted mostly as 
cohort effects (Mößner, 2006; Niedermayer, 2006; Patterson, 2007). In fact, the literature 
devoted to the influence of the media as an agent of political socialization is relatively small. 
Following the pioneering work by Chaffee and colleagues in the 1970s (see Chaffee and 
Young 1990 for an overview of their work) the topic has virtually been absent from the 
scholarly agenda, with recent exceptions such as Shah, Cho, Eveland & Kwak (2005). In the 
meantime the media landscape has changed profoundly and so has our understanding of civic 
engagement (Ward & de Vreese, 2010) and socialization processes, as I explained in Chapter 
1. In contrast to socialization studies conducted in the 1970ties, children and adolescents are 
now conceptualized as active participants in their own political upbringing. From this 
perspective media influence should not be regarded as an outside force. Media use should 
better be understood as a conscious choice of adolescents that has an impact on their political 
attitudes and behavior (Buckingham, 1997). 
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Extant research linking media use of young adults and potential effects on political 
behavior and attitudes is mostly based on single country studies, thereby ignoring the impact 
of contextual factors, even though these factors are highly relevant in explaining voting in 
general (Franklin et al, 1992) and political engagement in particular (Pacheco, 2008). 
Moreover, most extant studies rely on a relatively limited notion of media use, not taking into 
account the abundance of choice that today‟s media market offer. This is important since 
choice may lead people to turn away from news and prefer entertainment content (Prior, 
2007). Finally, much of our current knowledge rests on a classic but limited conceptualization 
of civic engagement. Young persons may turn out less at the polls. But, as Norris (2003b) 
points out, a shift from a citizen oriented engagement (voting, supporting a political party 
through voluntary work or donations) to cause oriented activism which includes consumer 
politics and legal as well as illegal demonstrations could have taken place.  
The study investigates the effect of media use on political attitudes and behavior, and 
it extends previous research on the citizen-oriented repertoire of civic engagement (voting, 
party preference), to also include new, cause-oriented forms of participation and a general 
outlook on politics. The analysis presented in this chapter is based on data of the European 
Social Survey, a large dataset collected in 22 countries that include measures of media use 
and political attitudes and behavior, which provides the unique opportunity to study macro- 
and micro level effects at the same time. 
Conceptualizing Political Socialization 
Political socialization is a concept that was widely studied and discussed in the 1960s 
and 1970s by e.g. Almond and Verba (1963) and Sigel and Hoskin (1981). Gimpel et al. 
(2003) integrated the various conceptualizations and defined political socialization as “the 
process by which new generations are inducted into political culture, learning the knowledge, 
values, and attitudes that contribute to support of the political system”. Hence, political 
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socialization has an explicit learning component. Learning what an individual has to know, to 
feel, and do to become a citizen that is needed in a particular political system. In the case of 
most Western countries the political system is democracy 
Socialization is a complex and continuous process in which cognitions and behavioral 
patterns are actively learnt through agents, such as parents, school and peers. Though the most 
important period for socialization is childhood and early adulthood, we keep on negotiating 
our socialization throughout the life course as the political world changes and we need to 
acquire new patterns of behavior to deal with it (Sears & Levy, 2003).    
A new political culture? 
Gimpel et al.‟s definition of political socialization refers to the term political culture as 
the object of political socialization, thus the collective attitude towards politics and the 
expression of those attitudes. However, the political culture of a system is not stable, but 
changes continuously as the societal parameters are transforming around it. The 
conceptualization of political culture in Western democracies is regularly debated and 
reassessed. Buckingham (1997) proposes that we are at the dawn of a “new political culture”, 
in which traditional, institutionalized acts of expressions of citizenship (as voting, engagement 
in political parties) are replaced by involvement in short-term political alliances that are solely 
created to support a specific interest (e.g. prevent war in Iraq, protect the environment, rally 
against Wall Street capitalism), and dissolve after the issue solved or not any longer of 
political relevance (Norris, 2003b).  
This development is important with regard to political socialization research for two 
reasons: first, it means that the political involvement of an adolescent cannot only be assessed 
by his or her intention to turn out and vote in an election or proximity to a political party, but 
also, and maybe even more importantly, by the engagement of a young person in cause-
oriented initiatives. Secondly, engaging in the new political culture can be done at any age 
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and is not institutionally linked to the moment when adolescents legally become adults. 
Engagement in cause-oriented political activism is not limited by institutional obstacle like a 
minimum voting age and can therefore be studied during adulthood. Hence, if one wants to 
research the civic engagement of teenagers before they are eligible to vote, it is a worthwhile 
undertaking to consider the cause-oriented forms of political involvement, e.g. the conscious 
boycott of products for political reasons, or signing petitions instead of the citizen-oriented 
repertoire of expressions of citizenship. 
Attitudes towards politics 
Political mobilization of adolescents is only one aspect of their introduction into the 
political culture of their country. According to Gimpel et al‟s definition of political 
socialization, the development of attitudes supporting the current political system is another 
relevant factor of the phenomenon. Research in political developmental psychology indicates 
that the process of development of those attitudes begins in a very abstract form with diffuse 
identification with political actors and institutions during preschool years. Van Deth et al. 
(2007) show, for example, that German children at the age of 6, already dispose over a 
general idea what a democracy is and are familiar with democratic values like equality before 
the law. Such perspectives dovetail with recent insights focusing on personality traits 
(Mondak et al., 2010) and genetics (Hatemi et al., 2010) as antecedents of political ideology 
and participation.  
During adolescence these vague allegiances become more pronounced when children 
slowly develop a rational approach towards politics (Atkin & Gantz, 1978). Attitudes towards 
politics do not only crystallize and become more concrete during adolescence, they also 
become increasingly independent from their parents political attitudes and preferences (see 
Chaffee and Yang, 1990). Moreover, political preferences developed during adolescence 
remain mostly stable over the course of life (Sears & Levy, 2003). Object of these attitudes 
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can be specific political figures, institutions, or policies, but it can also be the political system 
itself. In this chapter I am going to investigate both: whether an individual reports proximity 
to a political party (as one of the main actors in a democracy), and the trust an adolescent has 
in the various institutions that constitute the political system. 
Media and political socialization  
The development of political attitudes as well as political behavior is influenced by 
several agents, one of them being the media (see McLeod, 2010). According to political 
socialization theory, political attitudes are formed during childhood and adolescence and only 
to a small degree during adulthood (Huntemann & Morgan, 2001). Media effects research has 
also emphasized that investigating attitude formation processes at young ages is 
advantageous. It has been coherently shown that the prevalent effect of media exposure is to 
reinforce pre-existing attitudes. This is due to self-selection mechanisms: media users prefer 
selecting outlets that are likely to be consistent with their preferences to avoid psychological 
stress (Slater, 2007).  
However, most empirical studies in the field of media effects research focus on mass 
media influence on the political attitudes of adults, who already dispose over a developed set 
of political preferences. Contrary to this approach, this study investigates the influence of the 
media on adolescents. 
Two causal mechanisms 
To understand the impact of the media on political attitudes and behavior, it is 
necessary to consider the causal processes that link media exposure and political attitude 
formation. Two theoretical approaches can help to understand these mechanisms: Learning 
theory and media malaise. Whereas learning theory points to a positive impact of (news-) 
media consumption on political socialization, media malaise theorists claim that the media 
contribute to rising levels of political cynicism. 
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Learning theory 
Media are the primary source of political information on current political events for 
adolescents (Graber, 1997). For adolescents and adults alike, it is virtually impossible to 
witness all relevant political events in person, let alone discuss their implications with all 
concerned parties to place them into an interpretative framework. Political information is 
therefore evidently second-hand information, and the media are the most accessible and 
commonly used source for it. In that light, it cannot surprise that Dalton (1996) and Inglehart 
(1990) both find a strong correlation between the availability of political information through 
mass media and the overall level of political knowledge on the macro level (see also Curran et 
al., 2009). They claim that the expanded availability of media, especially in the second half of 
the 20
th
 century, has led to an increase in the spread of political knowledge.  
Exposure to political information increases in turn the ability of individuals to engage 
in politics (Delli Carpini 2000), as news provide information about current events that ask for 
participation and clarify the processes in a democratic society (see also Shah et al., 2009). 
This relationship is further explored in Chapter 4. Accordingly, ceteris paribus, I propose the 
following hypothesis. 
H1: The higher the exposure to news media, the higher the civic engagement. 
Media Malaise 
Contrasting claims of learning theory, advocates of media malaise expect a negative 
influence of the mass media on political interest and engagement. The core notion of this 
approach is that media coverage is inherently negative about politics. This is due to higher 
news value of negative news items (Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2007; Galtung & Ruge, 
1965). As a common sense journalistic doctrine puts it: “bad news is good news”. News items 
that reveal scandals in the political world criticize the performance of those in power or alert 
to unfavorable consequences of particular decisions, appeal more to the interest of the 
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audience as news stories that inform about the success of particular policies or the number of 
politicians that are scandal-free
3
. Positive information about politics is considered to be less 
relevant or interesting. This brings about a negative bias in the portrayal of politics in the 
news media (Kepplinger, 1998), which ultimately gives the audience the impression, that 
politicians act irresponsibly most of time and therefore cannot be trusted (Capella & 
Jamieson, 1997). 
Interestingly, media malaise theory has not been empirically substantiated by 
investigating the effects of exposure to news media, but for general media use (e.g. by 
Putnam, 2000). Exposure to news media, on the other hand, has been shown to have positive 
influence on political interest (Strömbäck & Shehata, 2010) and political involvement 
(Newton, 1999; Norris, 2003a). Holtz-Bacha (1990) stated explicitly, that higher levels of 
political cynicism are not associated with exposure to political information in the mass media 
but entertainment media. The negative relationship of entertainment media use and political 
involvement can be explained by potential cultivating effects of mass media, first 
conceptualized by Gerbner (1986). According to the cultivation approach, the media usually 
present a violent world in which danger is omnipresent. The audience, confronted with this 
biased image of reality, is left with a feeling of discomfort and insecurity, which results in a 
general alienation from the world, especially among those people who spend most of their 
leisure time using the media. The feeling of insecurity is paired with a feeling of inefficacy 
apathy and distrust (Putnam, 2000) towards society, in particular the political system.  
General alienation from the political world also leads to growing levels of political 
cynicism and a decline in civic engagement (Putnam, 2000). This means, that exposure to 
                                                 
3 Negativity is one of the news values, implying that events with negative implications are more likely to be picked up by the 
media than events with positive consequences. See also Galtung & Ruge (1965). 
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entertainment media can have demobilizing effects. Accordingly I can formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: The higher the exposure to entertainment media, the lower the level of political trust and 
civic engagement. 
 
Influence of system level variables 
Sigel and Hoskin (1981) introduced the idea that the political system can affect 
processes of political socialization. They claim that the smoother a democratic system 
functions the less adolescents engage in politics. The rationale behind this idea is that 
adolescents – occupied with their education, social and romantic endeavors and important 
choices concerning their professional future – prefer to spend their attention on other aspects 
of their lives than their political environment. If they feel that there is little need for their 
political input it is a rational choice to save scarce time and other resources. In other words, an 
adolescent only becomes Aristotle‟s famous political animal in when his or her live is 
significantly blemished by his political environment.  
The quality of democracy varies greatly among countries in Europe. Although the 
polity structure of all European countries is democratic, there are considerable differences in 
the degree to which they are able to achieve democratic goals: high levels of public health, 
education and wealth (Campbell, 2008). 
H3: The higher the quality of democracy in the country in which adolescents live, the lower 
the level of civic engagement. 
Methods 
To understand the influence of the media on political socialization I conducted an 
analysis of the first five rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), carried out in 2002, 
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2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010 respectively.
4
 The ESS is a general population survey carried out 
in about 22 countries in each wave among a representative sample of approximately 2000 
respondents per round and country.
5
 The countries included in this analysis are Austria, 
Bulgaria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Ukraine and UK. I selected all respondents that are at least 14 and at the most 20 
years old as the bases for my analysis
6
. Since I did not find significant differences in the 
dependent variables between the rounds, all data is combined for further analysis (N=6935). I 
am investigating two types of dependent variables in this study: political attitudes and civic 
engagement. 
Dependent Variables 
Attitudes towards politics 
Party affiliation: Proximity to a political party was assessed by asking the respondents 
whether they felt closer to a particular party compared to all other political parties. 
Political trust: In this study we investigate political trust as the opposite of political 
cynicism. Though these concepts are not equivalent, political trust has been used as a measure 
of media malaise in comparable studies (Avery, 2009) and is therefore chosen as an indicator 
                                                 
 
5 The ESS has not been carried out in , Estonia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Greece in the wave of 2002, in Bulgaria in the waves 
of 2002 and 2004; in Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg in the wave of 2006, and in Austria in the wave of 2008 
and 2010. Since we did not find significant differences between the waves and sufficient data was available for the other 
waves we chose to include those countries in the analysis nevertheless. 
6 Adolescence is the period in life in which an individual starts to become increasingly independent from the political ideas 
and preferences of their parents. This process starts after the 12th birthday. (Dennis, 1986). To dispose over a sufficiently 
large sample size in each country, we decided to include all adolescents in the sample and chose for a rather large age 
bracket. To account for the potential risks, we additionally controlled for age. 
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in this study. Political trust is measured by a scale constructed of 5 items that individually 
measure the respondents trust in the national parliament, the legal system, the police, 
politicians, and political parties (Cronbach‟s Alpha: 0.869). All items were measured on an 11 
point scale. 
Civic engagement 
Political involvement of adolescents is measured by two indicators of cause-oriented 
activism, as voting or other forms of citizen-oriented engagement is not relevant for the age 
group. They are signing a petition in the past 12 months, and boycotting a product for political 
reasons in the past 12 months.
7
 
Independent Variables 
Media exposure 
News exposure is operationalized as the number of hours a respondents spends on an 
average weekday reading newspapers, watching television news, or listen to political 
information on the radio. As each of those channels was assessed independently, they are 
summed up to assess the cumulative amount of time spend with news media each day. 
Entertainment exposure is assessed in a comparable manner. The ESS does not include 
measures of entertainment exposure, but it has a measure of general media exposure. To 
calculate entertainment exposure news exposure is subtracted from the number of hours spent 
with a particular medium in total on an average weekday. Subsequently all the individual 
entertainment scores are added up to assess the cumulative amount of time spend with 
entertainment media every day. That means that the measure for media entertainment also 
                                                 
7 We prefer to investigate two specific types of political behavior rather than constructing a scale, because the individual 
political activities differ so much with regard to the necessary level to involvement, costs, and goals that it would not be valid 
to construct an additive scale. The correlation of the two variables is .31. 
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includes advertising or educational formats. Both measures are weakly correlated (r= - 
0.2**)
8
.  
Quality of democracy 
Quality of democracy is assessed using the quality of democracy ranking (Campbell, 
2008). In this index a number of dimensions of functioning democracies are combined 
(political freedom, economic performance, health system, gender equality, general political 
knowledge, environmental performance, corruption). The empirical bases for the index are 
reliable and established sources such as the Freedom House Index of political freedom, World 
Bank, Political Handbook of the world. I chose this measure as it is able to grasp differences 
in the functioning of mature democracies in Europe, that most other measures of democracy 
(Freedom House, Vanhanen‟s Index of Democracy) cannot assess. 
Control Variables 
To specify the model and avoid overestimation of the effects a number of control 
variables were added that have been positively tested to be of empirical relevance in previous 
research (for example by Esser & de Vreese, 2007; Gimpel et al., 2003; Norris, 2003b; Sigel 
& Hoskin, 1981). Political interest
9
 was measured on a 4 point scale as a response to the 
                                                 
8 To make sure both measures are independent of each other despite the indirect manner in which entertainment media use is 
assessed, we calculated all analyses without the measure for entertainment. Though the power of the effect of news increased, 
it did not change the level of significance of the measure. 
9 The political interest of an adolescent is an odd factor in political socialization research as it can serve as dependent and 
independent variable at the same time. In Norris (2003b) study of youth activism it turned out to be the most important factor 
in explaining political engagement. Esser and de Vreese (2007) come to a similar conclusion with regard to youth turnout. 
Political interest is also proven to have a positive impact on exposure to political information, as those who are interested in 
politics also want to be up to date on current political developments. On the other hand, one could also argue that political 
interest comes about as a combination of influences from media, family, school, peers, and the political environment. In this 
chapter, however, political interest is included as an independent variable in the models, mostly to estimate the influence of 
the media, when political interest is controlled. 
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question: “How interested are you in politics?”, educational level was measured in years of 
education
10
, ideology of the respondents was assessed by a self-reported placement of the 
respondent on a 11 point left-right scale (10=right). Finally age and gender were added as 
control variables. 
Unfortunately, the setup of the ESS as a survey which mostly directed at adults means 
that there are a number of limitations in the data. This particularly holds for the control 
variables. Important control variables like the household income could not be included in the 
model as the vast majority of the sample of adolescents did not know the household income, 
To provide a reference point for the results as called for by Roller et al. (2006), I 
compare the results concerning the political attitudes and behavior of adolescents with the 
remainder of the sample. 
Results 
Political attitudes and engagement change during the life course. This is a result of 
both age and cohort effects. Figure 2.1 shows to what degree respondents of different ages are 
politically involved. As it becomes clear from Figure 2.1 the development varies between 
different modes of political involvement. The affiliation with a political party, for example, 
slowly increases with age, whereas participation in consumer politics peaks during adulthood. 
Taking a closer look on the specific development of adolescents, it becomes clear that 
adolescence is a crucial period for political socialization: the share of adolescents feeling 
close to a particular party steeply increases, whereas political trust is declining considerably. 
At the same time news media are increasingly becoming part of the media menu.
                                                 
10 Not completed primary education, primary or first stage of basic, lower secondary or second stage of basic education, 
upper secondary, post secondary, non-tertiary, first stage of tertiary, second stage of tertiary 
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Figure 2.1: Mean values of news exposure, attitudes towards politics, and civic engagement by age 
 
Figure 2.1: Mean value of media exposure (in hours), political engagement and political attitudes (on a 0 to 10 scale) by age.  
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Explanatory results 
To assess the influence of the media on political attitudes and behavior of adolescents 
multi level regression analysis explaining each of the independent variables above was 
applied. Logistic regression was applied in the analysis of political engagement. Political trust 
was analyzed by applying linear MLE regression. To account for country differences a 
random intercept was added. To provide a reference point for the results, each model is also 
calculated for respondents older than 21. This way, I can assess whether a certain finding is 
particular for adolescents or coherent with a general trend. 
 
Table 2.1: Fixed effects estimates for Models of the Predictors of political attitudes  
 Party affiliation  Political trust 
 14-20 (N=5481) 21+ (N=92547)  14-20 (N=4178) 21+ (N=92547) 
System level       
Quality of 
democracy 
-.002* (.014) .005 (.01)  .01  (.002) .10 (.01**) 
Individual level      
Age .01(.02) .01** (.0004)  -.16**  (.011) -.001** (.0003) 
Gender  -.12**  (.060) -.09** (.014)  .009  (.040) .06**  (.012) 
Political interest .86** (.044) .67** (.01)  .28** (.032) .35** (.008) 
Education .06** (.021) .01** (.002)  .03 (.010) .02** (.001) 
Ideology  .01 (.015) .008* (.003)  .03** (.018) .06* (.002) 
News exposure .005(.017) .002 (.003)  .01 (.013) -.009** (.002) 
Entertainment exp -.01
 
(.010) -.007** (.002)  -.01
(*)
 (.008) -.01** (.002) 
ESS Round .01 (.02) -.02** (.005)  .09 (.022) -.004 (.998) 
Intercept -3.14** (.413) -2.64** (.777)  -.2.97** (.095) -5.14** (.998) 
Wald chi
2 
476.24** 7311.23**  162.81** 415.82** 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
* p < 0.5, ** p < 0.1 
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Table 2.2: Fixed effects estimates for Models of the Predictors of civic engagement  
 Signed petition  Consumer politics 
 14-20 (N=5574) 21+ (N=94454)  14-20 (N=5567) 21+ 
(N=93502) 
System level      
Quality of 
democracy  
.10** (.016) .01* (.001)  .06** (.015) .08** (.012) 
      
Individual level      
Age .01 (.028) -.01** (.0005)  .01  (.036) -.008** (.0006) 
Gender  .29** (.067) .28** (.016)  .47**  (.085) .27**  (.018) 
Political interest .53** (.048) .40** (.011)  .54** (.059) .47** (.012) 
Education  .09** (.024) .06** (.002)  .03 (.031) .07** (.002) 
Ideology  -.06** (.017) -.07** (.003)  -.10** (.021) -.08** (.004) 
      
News exposure -.009 (.020) .01** (.003)  -.007 (.020) .01** (.003) 
Entertainment exp. -.03** (.012) -.02** (.002)  -.04** (.015) -.04** (.003) 
ESS round -.08** (.024) -.02 (.005)  -.03 (.29) .002 (.006) 
Intercept -11.67** (1.41) -8.12** (.961)  -8.84** (1.39) -10.13** (1.00) 
Wald chi2 279.50 489.12**  196.15** 4646.71** 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
* p < 0.5, ** p < 0.1 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present the findings of the analysis. The results reveal that, 
depending on the dimension of political socialization under investigation – behavior or 
attitude -, a different set of factors is significant for the explanation of its variance. This 
observation becomes particularly clear when looking at the influence of the two types of 
media exposure: exposure to news media and exposure to entertainment media. In most cases, 
the effects of news exposure and entertainment exposure do not coincide, but are 
complementary. 
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Media effects 
Hypothesis 1 states a positive influence of news media exposure on civic engagement, 
whereas Hypothesis 2 postulates a negative influence of entertainment media exposure on 
both types of dependent variables: civic engagement and attitudes towards politics. The 
results indicate that the direction of the effects is indeed in line with the hypotheses in most 
cases, however not all of the effects are significant. Exposure to news only has a statistical 
significant effect on the likelihood to boycott a product for political reasons or sign a petition 
but not for adolescents. Those effects were only significant for older respondents, which 
means that Hypothesis 1 is not supported. The negative effect of other media exposure on 
political attitudes and behavior (H2), on the other hand, can be confirmed for adolescents with 
regard to participating in politics as well as trusting politicians.  
The overall tendency of the variables can also be deducted from a visual examination 
of the predicted scores depending on a low, high or medium level of media exposure (Figure 
2). 
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`  Figure 2.2: Predicted scores of low, medium, or high media exposure 
 
Figure 2.2: Predicted scores of low, medium and high media exposure in a logistic multi-level regression. All other variables are set to mean. For all specifications 
see Table 1 & 2. 
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When comparing the younger cohort to the 34 to 40 cohort it becomes obvious that the 
mobilizing influence of news media is higher in the older cohort. While I do not find 
significant effects of exposure to news on consumer politics or signing a petition in the 
younger cohort, they are evident for the older cohort. This observation could be substantiated 
using moderation analysis, in which I found significant interaction effects consisting of age 
and news exposure (Beta: sign petition: .001**, Beta: consumer politics:.001**).  
There is also a significant interaction effect of age and entertainment media use in the 
model explaining political trust (Beta: -.001**). This means that spending more time with 
entertainment media leads to higher levels of distrust among the older generation. In case of 
proximity to a political party the opposite was the case. Here, the youngest respondents show 
the strongest effects (Beta: .005**).  
On the system level I find that citizens who live in countries with a lower quality of 
democracy generally show a lower level of political activism, which means that Hypothesis 3 
cannot be supported. On the contrary, I find significant in the opposite direction in most cases 
showing that stable democracies are more likely to bring about a politically active youth.  
Discussion 
In this chapter two questions concerning the relationship of media exposure and 
political socialization were addressed. The first question relates to the contradicting effects of 
entertainment exposure and news exposure. Whereas the latter has been proven to increase 
political knowledge and – in the long run – democratic participation of young adults in 
previous research, the first is presumed to contribute to media malaise, a sentiment of distrust 
in politics and politicians, nurtured by media products that present a violent, dangerous world.  
The results suggest that both, mobilizing and demobilizing effects of the media 
depending on the content an individual is exposed to. Use of entertainment content 
contributes to a feeling of distrust in politics and leads to lower levels of political engagement 
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among adolescents, yet exposure to news media stimulates higher political participation, but 
only among those older than 21. 
The second question posed in this study concerns the influence of the on civic 
engagement. The data suggests that there is a significant effect of quality of democracy on 
political attitudes and behavior. However, the direction of the predicted effects was not in the 
expected direction. Based on the work of Sigel and Hoskin (1981) I expected young citizens 
to be less involved in mature democracies. Yet, the results indicate that nations in which 
democracy is not functioning at its best – and not the mature democracies - leave their young 
citizens with little interest to engage. Possibly, because they feel that signing a petition or 
boycotting a product will not change anything as the political system is less responsive to the 
pressure of public opinion. 
To test system level influence data of the European Social Survey is used. In the ESS 
survey data from over 22 European countries is gathered. Although the size of the data set and 
quality of data collection in the European Social Survey imply that my results are of high 
reliability, the data was not collected directly for the purpose of this study which means that 
validity of some of my measures should be discussed. First, the indicator of entertainment 
media use is rather crude. As it is an indirect measure calculated based on general media use 
and news media use, it includes more than just entertainment media use, for example 
advertising or educative media content and does not account for infotainment or other hybrid 
forms of political and entertainment content. Moreover, both indicators of media use are 
measures of exposure and not attentive media use as media malaise theory would suggest. 
Second, online political participation and media use are not included. That means that this 
study does not account for new forms of political participation, for example through social 
network sites, which are especially relevant for the young generation, as I point out in Chapter 
4. However, since online and offline participation are correlated (Bakker & de Vreese, 2011), 
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explaining offline political participation is still worthwhile as it helps to identify sources of an 
active approach towards politics. Finally, measures of education and ideology are not assessed 
in an age appropriate fashion with regard to adolescents. This means that my results should be 
interpreted with caution acknowledging the limitations of the data.  
To eventually fully identify the causal mechanism that relates media exposure and 
political socialization, research on the effects of the media on political socialization should 
move beyond a cross-sectional research design. Taking on a longitudinal approach would 
allow us to address some interesting questions that are still open: How does the influence of 
the media develop over time? At what age do adolescents develop stable attitudes? This 
would also allow contribute to political development psychology with regard to media effects. 
Until today, the timing of media effects during the life course is uncharted territory. Finally, 
do media mobilize adolescents or do mobilized adolescent select media that mobilize them 
even more? I will come back to this question in the next chapter. 
The results showed that political trust is steeply declining during adolescence. 
According to my analysis the growing lack of confidence is fuelled by use of non-
informational media. Exposure to entertainment media content also has a significant negative 
effect on political participation. Adolescents and adults alike are less inclined to sign political 
petitions or boycott a product for political reasons as they spend more time using 
entertainment media. I interpret this finding in the light of media malaise theory implying that 
it is violent or negative media content that alienates its audience from the political world. It 
could also be argued that the relationship of entertainment media use and lack of participation 
is due to limitations in the time budget (Putnam, 2000). Time spent using media individually, 
cannot be spend on political activities. However, two observations of this study cast doubt on 
this alternative explanation. First, the size of the negative effect remains the same during the 
life course; though time spend with entertainment media decreases on average. Second, there 
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is a significant negative influence of entertainment media use on political trust. That means 
that also the attitude towards politics is affected by entertainment media use.  
When comparing media influence on political participation of adults and adolescents, 
it becomes apparent that the effects are more pronounced in the older cohort. Adolescence 
appears to be the period in life during which media malaise and political learning through 
media begins, but the effects of the media grows stronger over the life course. This is 
interesting to note, because adolescence is also the period in life with the highest exposure to 
media. Hence, one would expect that the media effects are the strongest. Yet, the opposite is 
the case. 
There are two possible explanations for this finding: First, the effects of media use 
unfold over time, implying that not the frequency of news media use causes political 
participation but the cumulative amount of time spend with the media over the life course. An 
alternative explanation is that media become a more important source of influence relative to 
other sources, as other agents of socialization (parents, school) become less influential during 
adulthood. Whichever explanation holds, both illustrate that political learning theory should 
be further developed to incorporate life cycle effects. We should also investigate the 
development of media effects in young adults as they first occur in order to find out more 
about how the relationship between media use and political mobilization comes about. 
The difference in the effect of news media between adolescents and adults can be 
interpreted as both, a cohort or an age effect. I suggest that cumulative media consumption 
during the life course affects political engagement. However, this does not mean that there are 
not be generational differences as well. In fact, literature in the field of political engagement 
research clearly suggests that one‟s generation or cohort is crucial in determining political 
participation, for example if there was high political conflict during the first election of a 
generation (Sears & Valentino, 1997). 
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Multi-level analysis of the data showed that political socialization is influenced by 
factors on the macro level and factors on the micro level. Quality of democracy turned out to 
be very influential in bringing about active citizens in Europe. The higher the level of public 
health, wealth or education, the more young citizens feel inspired to take on an active role in 
society. This means that in order to socialize a participating citizenry, one place to start is by 
providing a functioning political environment. 
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Chapter 3: Spiral of political learning. The reciprocal relationship of news media use 
and political knowledge among adolescents 
 
Manuscript under review 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the dynamics of reciprocal influence of political knowledge 
and attentive news use. News media are an important source for political information and 
contribute to political learning. Yet, this process becomes more efficient with increasing 
levels of pre-existing knowledge about the political world. In extant literature mutual 
interdependence is often suggested, but empirical proof is scarce. I propose to conceptualize 
the relationship of knowledge and news use as a reinforcing upward spiral, implying that 
growth in either of the two factors leads to growth in the other. The model is tested on data 
from a three wave panel survey among 888 adolescents using growth curve modeling. The 
results support the model of a reinforcing spiral of political learning. Interestingly, the 
influence of political knowledge on news use is estimated to be higher than the other way 
round. 
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News media are essential for political learning. By covering events and developments 
in the political world news media contribute to the political knowledge of their audience. 
Political knowledge, on the other hand, is a powerful predictor of news use (Price & Zaller, 
1993). In fact, knowing about politics is a precondition to make sense of news stories, because 
knowledge about political structures, actors and processes provides the context in which new 
information is processed. Without basic political knowledge new information remains 
meaningless. News use and political knowledge are therefore mutually interdependent. From 
a longitudinal perspective, mutual interdependence means that the process is ought to take the 
form of a self-reinforcing spiral, or in the words of Norris (2000), “a virtuous circle”. In this 
chapter I analyze the dynamics of learning from news media in detail using data from a three 
wave panel survey study of 888 adolescents. 
Panel survey data is well suited for this purpose and has several advantages over cross 
sectional survey data or experimental data. Cross sectional surveys assess whether and under 
which circumstances news use and political knowledge are correlated (e.g., Price & Zaller, 
1993; Shah, McLeod, & Yoon, 2001), but cannot answer questions of causality or dynamics. 
In other words, these studies cannot provide definite answer to the question whether 
individuals become more knowledgeable by using news or knowledgeable individuals are 
more inclined to watch or read the news. Even though, some cross sectional studies, most 
prominently Norris (2000), conclude that the answer is that both processes are at work 
simultaneously, they cannot support this notion with adequate empirical data. It is the goal of 
this study to demonstrate that the relationship between political knowledge and news use is in 
fact more than a positive correlation, and rather a mutually reinforcing spiral. This is 
important for our future theorizing about this dynamic relationship. 
Experiments, on the other hand, can clearly assess causality. The drawback of this 
approach is that they are conducted in a laboratory environment while forcing news exposure 
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(e.g. Eveland, Seo, & Marton, 2002). This casts doubts on the external validity of those 
studies. Moreover, effects found in experimental studies have only been measured over a very 
short term and might fade after a while. The foci of this study, however, are stable, long term 
developments in political knowledge. Therefore the analysis is based on data collected over 
period of two years.  
Political knowledge is a key factor in becoming an engaged citizen. In democracies it 
is of vital importance that citizens understand the processes and structures of the political 
system around them to participate (Sotirovic & McLeod, 2004). Any electoral decision can 
only be meaningful if voters have a general idea about candidates and the offices they are 
applying for. Moreover, political knowledge is also proven to have a positive impact on 
attitudes towards politics and participation. In fact, “no other single characteristic of an 
individual affords so reliable a predictor of good citizenship, broadly conceived, as their level 
of knowledge” (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996, 6). The more people know about politics, the 
more they are inclined to take on an active role in a democracy (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 
1995). An analysis of how young citizens learn about politics from the news media can 
therefore provide insight in the antecedents of how adolescents become active citizens. The 
relationship between political knowledge, the feeling to be informed and engagement is 
further discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Political learning from the news 
It is evident that news media are an important source of political information and 
contribute to political learning (Chaffee, Ward, & Tipton, 1970b; de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 
2006; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). However, as it is common for media effects, this is not a 
straightforward, stimulus-response process. Political learning is a complex procedure, that is 
conditional upon a multitude of factors: starting from the information environment on the 
system level (Elenbaas, de Vreese, Schuck, & Boomgaarden, in press; Prior, 2007) to features 
of the media that transport political information (Chaffee & Kanihan, 1997; Weaver & Drew, 
2001). Yet, the most important determinants of political learning reside on the individual level 
(Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). The reason behind the dominance of individual characteristics 
is that political learning is in nature a psychological process that consists of a number of 
cognitive steps (Sotirovic & McLeod, 2004)  
First, new information needs to be taken in. Mere exposure is not enough to guarantee 
an effect on political knowledge. Information also needs to comprehended and retained (Price 
& Zaller, 1993). The importance of this step cannot be stressed enough. Graber (1997), 
showed that most TV news users cannot remember most of the items they saw on the news 
broadcast , not to speak of any details of the news stories. In explaining whether a news story 
is remembered or not, individual motivation plays a key role (Elenbaas, de Vreese, Schuck, & 
Boomgaarden, in press)  
Second, mental representations of the information needs to be formed and these 
representations need to be linked to existing representations and schemata. In this context pre-
existing mental representations of political actors, structures and processes are of vital 
importance. The more cognitive networks and schemata already exist, the easier it is to 
connect and organize new information. Furthermore, individual cognitive abilities determine 
how much information can be processed (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 
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Third, new information needs to be reflected and deliberated. In order to enter the long 
term memory, new information needs to be recalled several times. Interpersonal 
communication about the subject plays can play an important role in this process, so can 
repeated exposure (Higgins, 1996). 
When looking at the process of political learning from the news in detail, in becomes 
apparent that it cannot be independent from pre-existing political knowledge (Chaffee & 
Schleuder, 1986). Especially, when considering the ability to link new information into a 
network of schemata, it is quite clear how essential political knowledge in the acquisition of 
new political knowledge actually is. To take this argument one step further, pre-existing 
political knowledge is in fact a precondition to use the news at all. Without it obtained 
information remains meaningless, and there is no need to tune in.  
But pre-existing political knowledge also factors in the motivation to retain 
information. First of all, because individuals who are motivated to follow the news are likely 
to be politically interested and knowledgeable in the first place (Elenbaas, de Vreese, Schuck, 
& Boomgaarden, in press). Second, because knowing about political processes and events that 
are taking place at a time, makes following the development of this process or event more 
attractive and relevant (Chang & Krosnick, 2003). 
Extant research has shown that efficient information processing is more likely among 
news users with specific social economic background characteristics. Among them are social 
economic status (Jerit, 2009), gender (Mondak & Anderson, 2004), formal education 
(Eveland & Scheufele, 2000) , and composition of the social network (Hively & Eveland, 
2009). Yet, the very same factors are also predictors of news use and general political 
knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). This implies that it is the same group of people that 
a) watches and reads the news, b) is able to understand and process information they came 
across, and c) has a high level of political knowledge. This leads to a gap in political 
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knowledge that divides citizenry in those who know and understand politics and those who 
don‟t, which has serious implications for democratic societies (Tlichenor, Donohue, & Olien, 
1970).  
Towards a dynamic model of learning from the news 
As I have established in the previous section, political knowledge and attentive news 
use are mutually interdependent. Higher levels of political knowledge makes news seem more 
accessible and relevant and provide a framework to make sense of the obtained information. 
Using the news, on the other hand, is an important source for political learning, at least if new 
information in the news is retained and processed. 
When taking on a longitudinal perspective it can be argued that what is conceptualized 
as mutual interdependence at a specific point in time, is in fact an upward spiral. Someone 
who knows already a fair amount about politics, becomes more attracted to news and is more 
likely to use it attentively in the future. Following the news attentively leads to rising levels of 
political knowledge over time. In its structure this spiral resembles the spiral dynamics of 
selective exposure proposed by Slater (2007). If this theory holds, than the difference in 
political knowledge between those in the upward spiral and those who are not, should become 
larger over time. Three hypotheses can be deduced from this notion. 
H1: Growth in political knowledge has a positive impact on growth in news use 
H2: Growth in news use has a positive impact on growth in political knowledge 
H3: The process of growth in news use and growth in political knowledge is mutually 
interrelated. 
Studies of knowledge gains have found evidence on specific aspects of this model. For 
example, Tlichenor, Donohue, & Olien, (1970) demonstrated that coverage of an issue widens 
the gap in knowledge about this issue, in one of the earliest studies on media related 
knowledge gaps. Those who knew about an issue beforehand learned more from coverage 
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than those who didn‟t. Norris (2000), demonstrated that political knowledge and news use are 
positively correlated based on multiple data sets reaching from European Election data to the 
U.S. National Election Survey, but causality or dynamics are not tested. Eveland, Hayes, 
Shah, & Kwak (2005) did test the causal relationship between political knowledge and news 
use in a two wave panel study, and concluded that a model of unidirectional influence of news 
use best describes the phenomenon. However, their study differs from this study in a number 
of aspects. Most importantly, the study is specific to an American presidential campaign. 
Political knowledge was defined as factual knowledge about issue placements of the two 
candidates and media use as exposure to campaign related information. Second, the model 
used in this study is not a model that explains growth in either political knowledge or news 
use, but the level of knowledge at the second measurement. In this study, however, I analyze 
the phenomenon as a general causal mechanism that is not specific to a certain political event 
explaining growth during a two year time span and not the absolute level of knowledge. To do 
so I assess whether causal relationships in growth in political knowledge and news are still 
significant when the other growth process is controlled. In other words, a comprehensive 
model of a reinforcing spiral of political knowledge is being tested. 
 
Political learning during adolescence 
Adolescence is a key phase for political learning, as it marks the period in which the 
brain is sufficiently developed for abstract and complex thinking. During childhood political 
knowledge is restricted to the knowledge of symbols and a general idea of power, whereas 
young adults are able to grasp the complex processes and institutions of modern democracy 
(Chaffee, Ward, & Tipton, 1970). Moreover, late adolescence is also a period in which many 
young citizens face their first electoral decisions. This gives political information and political 
knowledge a new relevance in their lives and a reason to seek out information about politics 
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on news media (Sears & Valentino, 1997).Therefore, adolescence is not only a life phase in 
which political knowledge develops, but also in which political knowledge is likely to be 
influenced by news media (Jennings, 1996).  
Although political learning in general occurs throughout the entire life course (Sears & 
Levy, 2003; Sigel & Hoskin, 1981), it is likely to be more pronounced among adolescents. 
Hence, it is more likely to find evidence for a reinforcing spiral within a two year time frame 
by using an adolescent sample. 
 
Methods 
In order to investigate the reciprocal influence of news use and political knowledge, I 
rely on a three wave panel survey conducted in the Netherlands between 2010 and 2012 
among a sample of adolescents aged 15 to 18 at the beginning of the survey. The data was 
collected through CAWI. The data collection was funded in part by the Amsterdam School of 
Communication Research and in part by the Swiss Science Foundation within the framework 
of NCCR democracy.  
Sample 
The sample was drawn from a population representative database administered by a Dutch 
opinion poll institute, GfK, using a quota sample. The quotas used were age (15 to 18), 
gender, and education. 1653 respondents participated in the first wave (June 16th through July 
10th 2011). 1186 of those respondents also participated in the second wave (June 16th 
through July 10th 2011). The attrition rate was 28%. The third wave took place from June 14
th
 
to July 3
rd
 2012. 888 respondents participated in the third wave, implying that the attrition rate 
was 25% from the second to the third wave  
Those respondents who did not participate in all three waves did not differ 
significantly from the panel in terms of gender, age, and educational level. 
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Measures 
News use. News exposure was measured using a combined measure of news exposure and 
attention to news
11
.News exposure is measured as a cumulative scale of exposure to 22 Dutch 
news sources (TV, newspaper and online new sources). For each outlet the typical exposure 
per outlet interval is assessed and added up.
12
 (M: 3.16; SD: 2.21). Attention to news was 
measured using a single item indicator on a seven point scale (M: 4.34; SD: 3.77)
13
. Attention 
to news and exposure were multiplied to create a combined indicator (M: 12.28, SD: 10.63).  
 
Political knowledge. Political knowledge was measured using a sum scale of answers 
to four different questions testing for general knowledge about democratic society. These 
questions cover knowledge about important aspects of Western democracies like the function 
of political parties and international politics. The purpose of using rather general questions 
instead of more common knowledge checks (e.g., by recognition of politicians) was to tap 
long term knowledge gains that are important for the development of democratic citizens. The 
                                                 
11 News exposure is combined with a measure of attention, because both of these factors of news use are essential to 
guarantee news processing (Chaffee & Schleuderer, 1986). In fact, attention to news measures have been proven to explain 
gains in political knowledge better than exposure as information that is not received attentively fades away quickly (Eveland 
2002). Chang & Krosnick (2003) tested a combined measure of exposure and attention as a moderator for various media 
effects. The moderator, the combined measure, was found to be significant in all cases, whereas the main effects of attention 
and exposure became insignificant, implying that a combined measure is able to explain most of the variance that would be 
explained by the individual factors otherwise. For sake of parsimony we rely on a combined measure in the models. To 
guarantee robustness we conducted additional test using the individual measures. 
12 It is important to note that this is a cumulative scale not a factor. Some of the TV shows are being broadcasted at the same 
time, so it is virtually impossible to be exposed to both. A similar argument can be made for newspapers. If a respondents 
reads one paid newspaper it is unlikely he will buy another. 
13 We chose a general measure for news attention based on the research of Chaffee and Schleuder, 1986 who have tested a 
number of detailed attention to news measures, but could not find significant differences compared to a general attention 
measure.  
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questions were adapted from IEA Civic education studies. Each question was recoded into 
1=correct answer and 0=wrong answer or don‟t know14. The recoded items were used to 
construct a scale (Cronbach‟s Alpha:.70; M: .27; SD: .02).  
The same questions were used in all three waves to insure that the questions had the 
exact same level of difficulty. Given the long time span between measurements, it could be 
expected that respondents are likely to have forgotten the questions. To test panel sensitation a 
representative sample of 200 respondents in the same age group was asked the same questions 
during the fieldwork period in 2011. There was no significant deviance in their responses 
compared to panel members. 
Covariates. Four covariates were used in the analysis; formal education, age, gender, 
and social economic status (SES). Data on age, gender, and formal education was provided by 
the research institute that carried out the field work. Formal education is assessed on a three 
point scale (low, middle and high education in secondary schools in the Netherlands). As we 
are dealing with an adolescent sample, education did not have to be completed at the time of 
the interview. Social economic status was assessed using a single item indicator in which 
respondents self-reported their social class on a five point scale (M: 3.53; SD: .01). 
                                                 
14 The four questions were: 1) In democratic countries what is the function of having more than one political party? a) To 
represent different opinions interests in the Parliament; b) To limit political corruption c) To prevent political demonstrations 
d) To encourage economic competition e) Don‟t know (Recoded M: .68; SD: .007). 2) What is the major purpose of the 
United Nations? a) Safeguarding trade between countries b) Maintaining peace and security among countries c) Deciding 
where countries‟ boundaries should be d)Keeping criminals from escaping to other countries e)Don‟t know (Recoded M: .77; 
SD: .006); 3) The government has lowered tax rates on income from interest and investment (finance income) and raised tax 
rates on salaries. A large group carried signs in protest in front of the government‟s buildings. The protesters are most likely 
to be... a)people who have large savings accounts b)people who own shares in companies c)unemployed d)people who 
receive government benefits e)…people who are employed in factories f)Don‟t know (Recoded M: .50; SD: .007); 4) A 
country has a declining birth-rate and an increasing life span. Which of the following problems will have to be solved as a 
result? a)Schools need to be built b)Pensions for the elderly have to be financed c)Low income housings have to be built 
d)Crime and violence have to be fought e)Don‟t know (Recoded M: .77; SD: .006). 
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Data Analysis 
In order to analyze the reciprocal influence of news use and political knowledge as a 
reinforcing spiral, two interrelated growth processes need to be modeled simultaneously. I 
rely on Structural Equation Modeling for this purpose. The model used is an adaption of the 
model used by Schemer (2012) to model a spiral of negative issue affects and campaign 
attention. In this model two parallel growth curves are estimated (Bollen & Curran, 2006). In 
a growth curve model, multiple measurements of the same indicator over time are used to 
model a latent intercept and a latent slope. The initial level of the dependent variables, 
political knowledge and news use, is modeled as a latent intercept. Intra individual variance in 
the dependent variables across waves is modeled as a latent slope (see Figure 1)
15
.  
                                                 
15 To model the latent intercept, the mean of the intercept of the individual indicators is constrained to zero and the regression 
weight of each of the paths between the indicators and their respective intercepts is set to 1. To model intra-individual linear 
growth the paths between the indicators and their respective slope are restricted to 1, 2, and 3. To account for autocorrelation 
the growth factors (latent slopes and latent intercept) are allowed to covary. 
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Figure 3.1. Analytical model of the reinforcing spiral of political knowledge and news use 
 
Notes: The figure shows only the structural relationships between political knowledge and news use. The effects of covariates 
are considered but not depicted in the model. Residuals and correlations between residuals are also considered, but not 
shown. 
Results 
The model proposed fits the data well (Chi square: 13.71; df: 7; p: .55; Comparative 
fit index (CFI): .996, Root mean error square error of approximation (RMSEA): .033), 
implying that conceptualizing political learning from news as an interrelated growth process 
is appropriate according to my data. Before discussing the reciprocal measures, let me first 
describe the two growth processes of political knowledge and news use separately. 
The mean of the slope of political knowledge is estimated to be .19**. This implies 
that political knowledge has grown significantly over the two year time span. The mean 
intercept of political knowledge is estimated to be 2.48. Keeping in mind that political 
knowledge is measured on a four point scale I can conclude that the initial level of political 
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knowledge is rather high. Intercept and slope of the political knowledge growth curve are 
significantly correlated (COV: -.10; SE. 49; p: .02). The direction of the correlation is 
negative. This means that individuals with a high level of political knowledge in wave 1 have 
obtained significantly less political knowledge than those with a low initial level of political 
knowledge. Given the high mean intercept of political knowledge, this is most likely a ceiling 
effect. 
When inspecting the estimations for the growth curve of news use, the picture is 
different. The mean slope is positive, but not significant (M: .51; SE: .49; p: .43). This means 
that there has not been an increase in attentive news use, besides what can be explained by the 
of political influence knowledge. Again, I find a negative, significant correlation between 
intercept and slope of news use (COV: -16.85; SE: 3.43; p: <.01). That means that 
respondents who use a variety of news media regularly in the first wave are less inclined to 
expand their news menu. 
The latent slopes of political knowledge and news use are not significantly correlated 
(COV: -.06; SE:.09; p: .51), but the latent intercepts are (COV: 2.12; SE:.81; p: <.01). The 
correlation of the initial levels of news use and political knowledge mean that the two 
variables are already dependent upon each other before my first measurement. 
Turning to the cross causal paths and hypothesis testing, I find confirmation for most 
of the hypotheses (see Table 3.1).   
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Table 3.1: Reciprocal influences of political knowledge and news use 
Parameters Estimates (SE) Parameters Estimates SE 
Political knowledget1  
news uset2 
.40* (.182) News uset1  political 
knowledget2 
.004 (.003) 
Political knowledget2  
news uset3 
 
.85** (.331) News uset1  political 
knowledget2 
.01* (.005) 
Note: Unstandardized parameters, *p<05; **p<.01 
Hypothesis 1 states a significant positive impact of political knowledge on news use. 
My findings support this hypothesis as there is a significant relationship between growth in 
political knowledge and growth in news use one year later. It is worth noting that the 
estimated influence seems to have doubled during one year.  
Hypothesis 2 states a significant effect of growth in attentive news use on political 
knowledge. Here, the results are mixed. Whereas I do not a find a significant impact on news 
use on political knowledge one year later in the first wave, this path is estimated to be 
significant in the second wave. Eyeballing the results we see that like in the case of the 
influence of political knowledge, the size of the effect has doubled in the second wave. 
With regard to the third hypothesis it can therefore concluded that growth in political 
knowledge and growth in attentive news use are interrelated. Yet, the influence of political 
knowledge is on news use is much stronger than the other way round. First, because political 
knowledge is consistently estimated to influence attentive news use in both time periods. 
Second, the level of significance is for this path is much stronger. 
Four control variables were included in the analysis. Adding the control variables to 
the model did not change the results significantly. When looking at the effect of the control 
variables on the growth factors, a few interesting observations can be made. The initial level 
of political knowledge is influenced by all four control variables. Older, male, highly 
educated respondents, with a higher social economic status are predicted to have a higher 
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level of political knowledge at the start of the first wave. Yet, younger respondents are likely 
to learn more about politics during the two year time span. With regard to news use, the 
picture is slightly different. Older, female, higher educated respondents are estimated to have 
higher initial levels of news use. Those with a higher education are less likely to increase their 
use of news over time. 
Table 3.2: Effects of control variables on the growth factors 
 Intercept political 
knowledge 
Slope political 
knowledge 
Intercept news use Slope news use 
Sex  -.18** .10 .10** -.09 
Age .21** -.23** .12** -.09 
SES .12** .08 .16 .09 
Education .29** -.12 .27** -.25** 
Note: Standardized parameters , *p<05; **p<.01 
Robustness checks 
Given the complex nature of measures and models presented in this chapter, a number of 
robustness checks have been performed to insure reliability of the results. 
Random effects regression model. First, I calculated random effects models using 
either change in political knowledge or change in news use as dependent variable and the 
other factor as independent variable. Random effects regression estimation is a more 
conservative and reliable test of causal relationships. The disadvantage of this type of model 
is, however, that the interrelation of both factors cannot be tested simultaneously. The results 
of this test support my analysis. Attentive news use is estimated to have a significant effect on 
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political knowledge (Beta:.08** SE.01) and political knowledge is estimated to have a 
significant effect on attentive news use (Beta:.14** SE:.02)
16
.  
News exposure and attention to news. As I am using a combined measure of news use 
and attention to news, I tested whether the results hold up when both factors are tested 
independently. The results are mixed. I do find comparable results for models based on 
attention to news. (CFI: .97; RMSEA: .02). All relevant estimates that are significant in the 
combined model are also significant in a model based on attention to news only (w1 
newsw2 political knowledge: Beta: .03(*) SE:.01, w2newsw3 political knowledge: Beta: 
.07; SE: .03, w1 political knowledge  w2 news: Beta: .75*; SE:.34, w2 political knowledge 
 w3 news: Beta: .15** SE: .06). In the model relying on exposure to news only (CFI: .98; 
RMSEA: .06) this is not the case. Here, I do find a significant impact of political knowledge 
on exposure to news, but exposure to news has no significant effect on political knowledge. 
(w1 newsw2 political knowledge: Beta: .03; SE: .06; w2newsw3 political knowledge 
Beta: .07; SE: .11; w1 political knowledge  w2 news: Beta: .23**; SE: .009, w2 political 
knowledge  w3 news: Beta: .46**; SE: .005). It should be noted, that in this model the 
correlation between the two slopes becomes significant, implying that the relationship 
between growth in exposure to news and growth in political knowledge is better described as 
a parallel process. 
  
                                                 
16
 Furthermore, I used SEM to test whether alternative causal paths would fit the data better than the 
proposed model. Yet, excluding the cross paths or estimating uni-directional effect models (only media effects or 
only knowledge effects) lead to a significantly worse model fit. 
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Discussion 
In this chapter I set out to test the idea of a reinforcing spiral of political learning, to 
get a better understanding of the relationship found between political engagement and 
political information media use in Chapter 2. Extant studies on the relationship between news 
use and political knowledge have often concluded that growth in political knowledge and 
increase in attentive news use must be interrelated (Norris, 2000; Price & Zaller, 1993), but 
until now empirical proof is scarce. This study looks at the mutual interdependence from a 
longitudinal perspective. If the effects of political knowledge and news use are disentangled 
over time, they take the shape of a reinforcing spiral, which resembles the spiral of selective 
exposure put forward by Slater (2007). 
The results support the conceptualization of a reinforcing spiral. However, according 
to the data, the two sides of the spiral are not equally powerful. Political knowledge is a much 
better predictor of future attentive news use than the other way round. Two conclusions can 
be drawn from this finding. First, the upward spiral of political learning can be entered at both 
ends. In order to stimulate political learning, it is effective to encourage young citizens to read 
or watch more news. Yet, it is probably even more efficient to spark the upward spiral at the 
end of political knowledge. The results imply that adolescents first need to have a general 
understanding of democratic institutions and democratic processes, before they are willing to 
follow the news attentively. 
Second, we should be careful to over-interpret media effects on political knowledge in 
cross sectional studies. My findings suggest that causality in the relationship of political 
knowledge and news use goes in fact both ways, and more importantly, the reverse path is 
probably stronger. In other words, the commonly found correlation of political knowledge and 
news use (e.g. Chaffee, Ward, & Tipton, 1970; Norris, 2000); is rather a result of an increased 
interest in news of individuals with a high level of political knowledge, than a result of 
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political learning through news media. It is important to note that this also holds when 
covariates are included in the model. 
By using an adolescent panel I intended to measure the antecedents of the upward 
spiral. At this age neurological development is advanced enough to enable grasping abstract 
information (Chaffee, Ward, & Tipton, 1970a) , and individuals are slowly growing in their 
role as active participants in democracy (Sears & Levy, 2003) , which makes political 
information relevant for the first time. However, the results suggest that political knowledge 
and news use are already correlated at the age of fifteen. That means that the analysis does not 
cover the antecedents of the spiral. Accordingly, children younger than fifteen must already 
be able to make enough sense of news to learn from it about political structures. The observed 
high initial level of political knowledge supports this conclusion. That means that the 
foundation of the spiral of political knowledge is probably laid much earlier. This finding is 
line with a recent study of Prior (2010) on the development of political interest over the life 
course. He found that political interest is already fully developed at the age of 16 and changes 
little over the life course. To fully uncover the beginning of the spiral it is necessary should 
start observing the process at a young age in future research. Yet, even though the very 
beginning of the spiral was measured, it was still investigated at an early stage. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn with regard to the effect of covariates in my 
analysis. According to the data, male, highly educated respondents, with a high social 
economic status have higher initial levels of political knowledge and news use (with the 
exception of the higher initial level of news use among women). This finding is in line with 
extant literature on the knowledge gap (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; Jerit, 2009; Mondak & 
Anderson, 2004). Yet, these factors had little impact on the growth in political knowledge and 
news use. However, the analytical model was designed to validly measure news effects and 
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the effect of background variables were used as covariates only, we should not interpret too 
much into the lack of effects of background factors on growth in knowledge.  
Another interesting finding of this study worth noting is that the upward spiral of 
political learning is not found when news use is defined as mere exposure to news. Only once 
exposure is weighted by the amount of attention news users are paying to the news, the spiral 
occurs. This finding reiterates the results of other studies on knowledge effects of news 
(Chaffee & Schleuder, 1986) , and is linked to the argument that political learning is a 
psychological process that is dependent upon motivation and ability of the recipients of 
political information to retain and process new information (Price & Zaller, 1993). By 
weighting exposure with attention to news measures the notion of motivated news use was 
included in the model, as it allows to distinguish between those who are not interested in 
processing information and those who actively seek out the news. 
In this study a complex structural model based on three waves of panel data is 
presented. Though the data fits the theoretical model well, a number of limitations of this 
study should be taken into account when interpreting the results: First, the interval of one year 
in between the measurements, which could be either too long or too short, depending on the 
point of view. Political learning is a life-long process (Sears & Levy, 2003) , and a time span 
of two years is therefore relatively short. An interval of one year in between the 
measurements, on the other hand, can be considered to be rather long. It might very well be 
that political knowledge and news use develop in a much faster pace. For example, de Vreese 
and Boomgaarden (2006) demonstrate knowledge gains during a very short time period, so do 
many studies of knowledge gains during electoral campaigns (W. P. Eveland, Hayes, Shah, & 
Kwak, 2005). That means that I am neither able to present a complete model of the dynamics 
of political learning nor a model on a very detailed level. Instead I provide a compromise 
between long and short term effects – a model of a specific section of the spiral in bird‟s eye 
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view. Second, as an adolescent sample forms the bases of this analysis, the generalizability of 
my results can be questioned. In order to be confident that my results hold for the general 
population, the analysis would have to be repeated with older and younger respondents. Third, 
in this study only three waves of data are available to model longitudinal developments. This 
is the minimal amount of measurements to construct such a model. Additional measurements 
would increase the robustness of the model as such.  
These shortcomings aside, this study contributes to the extant body of literature on 
news effects on political knowledge by proposing and testing a theoretical model of the 
dynamics of political learning from the news. It advances our knowledge on the topic in 
several ways: 1) By using a measure of news use, that combines exposure on all major 
sources of news in one country, including specific internet news sources, and attention to 
news, 2) By taking on a longitudinal perspective which allows to test the mutual causal 
influence of news use and political knowledge simultaneously, 3) By adding the dimension of 
time to the notion of mutual interdependence of the two factors, which leads to the 
conceptualization of a reinforcing spiral of political knowledge. 
One question remains open. What happens to those who have no part in the upward 
spiral? Those who never build in enough knowledge to get interested and understand the 
news? If only those who already know fairly much about politics can learn from the news, 
how can adolescents with low political knowledge become informed and engaged citizens? It 
is clear that media can only provide a very small part to the solution for this problem and the 
importance of political education in school cannot be emphasized enough. But once the 
foundation is laid, news media are a prime place to enrich and reinforce political knowledge. 
The possibilities to raise political engagement through media is further explored in Capter 5.  
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Chapter 4: Pathway to political participation: The influence of online and offline news 
media on internal efficacy and turnout of first time voters. 
 
 
Manuscript under review 
 
Abstract 
News media play a key role in informing young citizens about politics and cultivating 
a sense of political efficacy. Online news media, in particular, are expected to have a positive 
impact due to their interactivity and new opportunities to share and discuss information. This 
study analyzes the impact of online and offline news media use on the growth in internal 
efficacy among adolescents, based on data collected in a three wave panel survey in the 
Netherlands (N=729). Additionally the impact of internal efficacy on turnout is being tested 
using a fourth wave of the same sample (N=612). The results show that while newspaper 
reading has the strongest effects among traditional news sources, actively participating in the 
communication process of political information online has the strongest impact on internal 
efficacy. Internal efficacy, in turn, is found to be a significant predictor of first time voters. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of media use as a pathway to political participation 
through internal political efficacy. 
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To many teenagers and adolescents the political world appears to be a very 
complicated place. So complicated, in fact, that they have the impression that they are not 
qualified or competent enough to participate in it. The decrease of internal political efficacy 
among the youngest generation is often seen as a serious threat for democracy (Kaid, 
McKinney, & Tedesco, 2007). Social scientists have therefore devoted a considerable amount 
of work to gain insight into how adolescents can learn about politics (see also Chapter 3 of 
this dissertation) in order to feel competent enough to turn out and vote (Beaumont, 2010; 
Delli Carpini, 2000). 
In the discussion about potential solutions to the problem, media, in particular new 
media, play a key role as they can provide relevant information about political actors and 
processes and foster to the political understanding of their users. After all, citizens of the 
youngest generation are the first digital natives and have ample skills to search, read, react to, 
and create political messages on the Internet. Moreover, in many European countries access to 
the Internet for this generation is almost universal. In the Netherlands, for example, 95% 15 to 
25 year olds use the Internet on a daily bases (CBS). 
There is some empirical evidence that indicates that internet use, internal political 
efficacy, political participation turnout of adolescents are indeed connected (Kushin & 
Yamamoto, 2010; Quintelier & Vissers, 2008). However, most of these studies are based on 
cross-sectional data or small scale experimental research. This chapter adds to the existing 
research in two ways. First, by relying on panel survey data collected over the course of two 
years the level of internal efficacy is not investigated at a fixed point in time. The focus is on 
change in the dependent variable over time and its potential causes. This way, this study 
answers a recent call for a longitudinal perspective on the phenomenon (Weaver Lariscy, 
Tinkham, & Sweetser, 2011). 
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Second, I do not look at the Internet as an isolated source of information. Instead this 
study includes classic information sources, such as newspapers and TV news as well as new 
media sources of information to find out which of these sources contribute to the development 
internal efficacy. By providing an integrated analytical model of a typical political 
information diet of an adolescent and its effect on internal political efficacy, this chapter also 
contributes to the academic debate on sources of political efficacy in a theoretical way. 
Finally, evidence is provided that internal political efficacy has a strong impact on electoral 
participation in the same sample, arriving at a comprehensive analysis of the pathway from 
adolescent news media use to political participation. 
Digital natives and internal political efficacy 
Political efficacy is at the core of beliefs and values needed to participate in a 
democratic society. It is a personality trait acquired early in life that influences the degree to 
which citizens participate in politics throughout their lives. Therefore, determinants and 
mechanisms leading to the development of “the feeling that political and social change is 
possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about the change” 
(Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1971, p. 187) have been in the focus of research in political for 
the past sixty years in political science and psychology alike (Beaumont, 2010). The concept 
can be distinguished into two dimensions: external efficacy, which is primarily dealing with 
the “responsiveness of governmental authorities and institutions to citizens‟ demands” 
(Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991, p. 1408) and internal efficacy, defined as beliefs about one‟s 
own competence to understand and to participate effectively in politics” (Niemi et al., 1991, 
p. 1408). Closely related to the latter dimension is information efficacy, a concept put forward 
by Kaid and colleagues (2007) and describes citizens voters confidence in their own political 
knowledge. 
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Mass media, in particular newspapers, have been found to play an important role in the 
development political efficacy among young citizens in the past (Chaffee & Kanihan, 1997). 
By watching news on TV and reading about the political world in daily newspapers 
adolescents familiarize themselves with political actors and processes and build political 
knowledge (Delli Carpini, 2000; Shah, McLeod, & Lee, 2009). Over the course of years they 
become increasingly confident about their skills to participate in politics and reach sufficient 
levels of political efficacy. 
However, political information in the mass media does not reach a large share of the 
youngest cohort anymore. According to some scholars, declining numbers in newspaper 
readership among young readers, decreasing interest in TV news (Huang, 2009) and dramatic 
gaps in political knowledge (Kaid et al., 2007) are all symptoms of the same disease. The 
youngest generation– in the words of Mindich (2005) – is “tuned out” from the traditional 
news. Others argue that adolescents have not tuned out but found a new arena of political 
information: the Internet. This is not simply a shift of information source, political 
information on the Internet can be a completely different experience due to its social (Bennett, 
2008) and interactive (Tedesco, 2007) quality. To the youngest generation, that is familiar 
with the social character of information on the Internet, a news item is more than an event 
shown on the media, it something that can be shared, forwarded, commented on or remixed 
(Coleman, 2008).  
In the context of explaining growth in internal political efficacy this is an important 
notion. Previous studies have shown that talking about political events, is a much better 
predictor on outcome variables of political involvement than mere exposure to the news (Shah 
et al., 2009). This is due to the way adolescent‟s process political information. During 
conversations about abstract political processes with peers, parents or teachers, they make 
sense of what happened and are introduced to potential interpretations of the events (Mutz, 
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2002). Of course, events reported in traditional news media can spark political discussions as 
well, but on the Internet a political debate is more accessible. Articles usually allow readers to 
comment and engage in a debate with other readers, they can be shared on SNS with minimal 
effort, and hyperlinks provide the opportunity to find out more about the subject or even 
participate online, for example by signing an online discussion. Moreover, conversations can 
be started without the need to be at the same place at the same time. Finally, to the youngest 
cohort that spends a significant share of the day on social media, sharing and talking online 
about something they have encountered is a standard way to deal with information (Weaver 
Lariscy et al., 2011). 
However, despite growing empirical support for the causal mechanism connecting use 
of online political information and internal efficacy (Bakker & de Vreese, 2011; Lee, Shah, & 
McLeod, 2012; Tedesco, 2007) positive effects on adolescents are still hard to trace on a large 
scale in the field (Boulianne, 2009; Esser & de Vreese, 2007). If effects of political 
communication are found, other sources of information like newspapers and TV were omitted 
from the model and the effects are rather small (e.g. Kenski & Stroud, 2006). This might be a 
consequence of limited interest in political online participatory media among adolescents 
(Bakker, 2013) and the countless opportunities to select information that is welcome and even 
personalize news sources in a way to avoid unwanted (political) news. 
 
Hypotheses and analytical model 
In order to study effects of news media on internal political efficacy and participation 
it is important to take into account all aspects relevant to the process. An integrated model 
should include measures of usage of traditional sources of political information, TV news and 
newspapers, as well as online sources of political information. 
H1: News use has positive effect on internal efficacy 
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   H1a: Use of TV news has a positive effect on internal efficacy 
   H1b: Use of newspapers a positive effect on internal efficacy 
   H1c: Use of online news sources has a positive effect on internal efficacy 
Moreover, we need to not merely include a measure of internet usage, but differentiate 
what it means: simply reading an article or actively engaging in a political discussion by 
forwarding or commenting on it (civic messaging) (see also Bakker & de Vreese, 2011). In 
the latter case a much stronger effect is to be expected as the communicative process inspires 
information processing and taking a stance on political issues thereby empowering young 
citizens (Tedesco, 2007). According to the communication mediation model by Shah et al. 
(2005), these effects could even fully mediate effects of online political information sources. 
H2: Civic messaging has a positive effect on internal efficacy 
Internal efficacy as a driver of political participation 
A decrease in electoral political participation among the youngest generation has 
raised concerns both in the scientific and political world. Though the US have witnessed a 
recent increase in turnout among the youngest voters, the general trend is towards less and 
less participation. In Europe the last few elections were characterized by an increasing 
abstinence of young citizens from the ballots. In the Netherlands the turnout rate among 
voters younger than 25 has dropped by over 20% in the last three elections (CBS).  
According to the research of Kaid and colleagues (2007) this can be deducted to a lack 
of internal political efficacy, or information efficacy. Especially the youngest generation feels 
that they lack the competence and knowledge to take an electoral decision. Given that internal 
efficacy is highly predictive of political participation among adults as well (Clarke & Acock, 
1989; Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002), I expect to find that those who feel confident about their 
political knowledge and understanding are more inclined to turnout at the first elections they 
are eligible to participate. 
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H3: Internal efficacy has a positive influence on the likelihood to turn out at the first 
elections. 
Method 
In order to investigate the influence of differential media use on internal efficacy, I 
rely on a three wave panel survey conducted in the Netherlands between 2010 and 2012 
among a sample of adolescents aged 15 to 18 at the beginning of the survey
17
. To test the 
effect of internal efficacy a fourth wave was added directly following the general election 
taking place in the Netherlands in October 2012. 
Sample 
The sample was drawn from a population representative database administered by a 
Dutch opinion poll institute, GfK, using a light quota sample. The quotas used were age (15 to 
18), gender, and education. 1653 respondents participated in the first wave (June 16th through 
July 10th 2011). 1186 of those respondents also participated in the second wave taking place 
from June 16th through July 10th 2011 (attrition rate: 28%.). The third wave took place from 
June 14
th
 to July 3
rd
 2012. 888 respondents participated in the third wave (attrition rate: 25%). 
The fourth measurement took place from 14.09.2012 to 24.09.2010. 746 respondents 
participated in the final wave (attrition rate: 16%). Panel attrition did not lead to a significant 
change in the composition of the panel with regard to key demographic variables age, gender, 
and education.  
Measures 
News use: Three different modes of news use are included in the model explaining 
internal efficacy: TV news use, newspaper use, and internet news sources. All items 
concerning news use are measured as exposure to a specific news outlet in days a week (1 to 
                                                 
17
 The data collection was funded in part by the Amsterdam School of Communication Research and in 
part by the Swiss Science Foundation within the framework of NCCR democracy. 
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7). To achieve a parsimonious model, measures of use of specific news outlets are combined 
by calculating the mean per mode of news. For TV news use I combined use scores of the 
main evening news broadcast in public and commercial TV (M: 3.49, SD: .03). Internet news 
use is a combined a measure of use of a webpage of a newspaper, webpage of a TV news 
show, or use of the main online only news source in the NL (nu.nl) (2.54, SD: .03). 
Newspaper use was assessed by combining exposure scores to national quality newspapers or 
regional newspapers (M: 2.25, SD: .03).  
Civic messaging: The level of civic messaging was assessed using a scale of items 
measuring participation in any of the following forms of political online communication (M: 
0.18, SD.004). Post a political message or video on a social network site (SNS), Chat or 
(micro)blog about politics, sign an online petition, participate in an online discussion, start an 
online discussion about politics, organize an online petition, join a political cause on a SNS, 
forward an email with political content, and email an politician. All items were measured on a 
three point scales (never, sometimes, often) (Cronbach‟s Alpha: .80). A factor analysis was 
carried out to insure that the scale is one-dimensional. 
Internal efficacy: Internal efficacy was measured using the standard item: 
“Sometimes politics seem so complicated that a person like me can‟t really understand what‟s 
going on”. It has been a standard item in the internal efficacy scales used in the American 
National Election for decades (Niemi et al., 1991) and is also used as a single item indicator in 
large scale surveys like the European Social Study or the Norwegian election study. The item 
was measured on a 7 point scale (M: 3.41, SD: .03).  
Turnout: Turnout at the first elections is assessed as a binary measure of self-reported 
behaviour. In order to decrease over-reporting of turnout the questionnaire offered three 
different categories to report non-participation (“normally I am voting, but this time I could 
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not make it”; “I thought about voting, but this time I did not do it”, and” I have not voted”) 
which were later recoded into one category.  
Controls: Age, gender, and formal education were added to the model as control 
variables. Education is measured by type of school that the respondent is currently attending 
or has attended in the past (low, middle, or high). 
Analysis 
To make optimal use of the panel data random effects generalized least square 
estimation is used, because it is the most efficient form estimation and provides the 
opportunity to control for relevant background factors. To insure the reliability of the analysis 
a Hausman test was carried out that yielded no significant differences between fixed and 
random effects model (p>.01). The advantage of this approach is that instead of predicting a 
level of internal efficacy at a given point in time, as a cross sectional or auto-regressive model 
would, this model predicts change in the dependent variable based on change in the 
independent variables (for example, if adolescents starts reading a daily newspaper, or starts 
engaging in online discussions more frequently). This means that the causal relationships are 
tested in a more valid and conservative way.  
However, this approach forecloses to test a full model including media use, internal 
efficacy and turnout, as the latter variable is only measured once. The analysis is therefore 
split in a panel model predicting change in internal efficacy and a model that predicts turnout 
on with internal efficacy as the main predictor. Moreover, measures of news use were not 
included in the final wave of the panel, as the final wave of the survey had to be rather short 
in length. I therefore test the effect of internal efficacy on turnout using a minimal, 
parsimonious model. To ensure reliability of the results the model is retested including an 
inclusive set of known factors of internal efficacy that have been measured during the third 
wave, three months prior to the elections. 
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Results 
Table 4.1 presents the results of the panel data regression analysis explaining change 
in internal political efficacy. The first model includes the use of the three kinds of news 
sources: TV news, online news, and newspapers as well as control variables. When 
comparing the three modes of news use it becomes apparent that newspaper usage is the 
strongest and most significant predictor of internal political efficacy. TV news use has no 
significant impact on the dependent variable, whereas the usage of online news sources is 
predicted to have a slightly significant effect on internal political efficacy. Hence, H1 is 
partially confirmed by the analysis.  Both online and offline news media contribute to rising 
levels of internal efficacy, with the exception of TV news. 
However, this effect becomes insignificant once civic messaging is added to the model 
(Model 2), implying that active online political communication mediates the effect of political 
information obtained online. Looking at the second model it also becomes clear that civic 
messaging is by far the most important predictor in explaining an increase in internal political 
efficacy over time. The analysis therefore supports the proposition of H2.  
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Table 4.1: Random Effects Panel Model Results Predicting Change in Internal Political 
Efficacy Using GLS Estimation (N = 729 individuals in 3 waves) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable  β SE Β SE  
Intercept  2.63** .56 1.53** .58  
TV news use  .03 .02 .03 .02  
Online news sources use  .06* .02 .01 .02  
Newspaper use  .09** .02 .05* .02  
Education  .40** .10 .39** .10  
Gender  -.47** .10 -.49** .10  
Age  .01 .03 .005 .03  
Civic messaging    1.29** .19  
Ρ .45 
69.96** 
.45 
116.95** Wald χ2 
 
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. 
Turning to the effect of internal efficacy on the likelihood to participate in the first 
elections I find strong support for H3 in my data (Table 2)
18
. As it becomes apparent from 
Table 4.2 internal efficacies is a key driver of turnout. If young voters feel only a little more 
efficacious, measured in one item step on a seven point scale, the odds to turn out and vote 
increases by nearly 50%. 
                                                 
 
18 Given the small N, we chose to present a parsimonious including only a few key control variables here. A model based on 
an inclusive list of control variables (political interest, social economic status, parental education, mobilization through 
others, and general media use was also estimated and yielded no different results with regard to significance level and size of 
the effect. These control variables were measured during the third wave three months prior to the elections. 
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Table 4.2: Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Turnout (n = 
612)  
Predictor B SE B 
Internal efficacy .46** .10 
Age .07 .15 
Education .58* .30 
Gender .35 .28 
Intercept -2.0 2.6 
Note:. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  2: 31.08** 
 
Discussion 
In this chapter I analyzed how news use and civic messaging can contribute to the 
growth of internal efficacy in a period that is crucial for the development of political skills, 
namely the two years leading up to the first general election. The effects of the different news 
sources are not tested in a vacuum, but in an integrated model of political communication 
relevant to the age group. This allows comparing the influence of the different sources and 
reliably attributing effects to the correct source. 
The results show that for young citizens acquiring confidence in their competence to 
participate in the political system by using political information is a complex process. 
Whether or not news use contributes to internal political efficacy depends a) on the type of 
medium in which political information is presented and b) on the level of involvement. 
According to the data newspaper reading is still the most effective information source with 
regard to the development of internal political efficacy. These results are in line with research 
dating back as far as the 1970ties as well as recent studies on the effect of news use on 
political knowledge and engagement (Chaffee & Kanihan, 1997; Esser & de Vreese, 2007). 
Given the downturn in newspaper readership in the past decades, especially among the 
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youngest generation, these findings raise concerns. If TV and internet news sources cannot 
replace the informational value of newspapers, how will future generations acquire the 
confidence in their competence to participate in the political process? 
The analysis presented in this chapter provides a partial answer to this question. 
According to the results digital natives are indeed best informed through the Internet.  
However, this is under the condition that they assume an active role in the communication 
process. Similar to the findings of Chapter 3, I find again that mere exposure does not lead to 
political learning. Information needs to be processed in order to be effective. If adolescents 
are part of message construction, be it by engaging in an online discussion or merely by 
forwarding a political message to their peers, their level of internal political efficacy rises 
significantly. The effect is stronger than the effects of usage of any of the more passive form 
of news, including newspapers. These results fit well into the communication mediation 
model proposed by McLeod and his colleagues (McLeod, Shah, Hess, & Lee, 2010). By 
communicating about political messages interpersonally, online or offline, adolescents 
process information and become more engaged. 
Yet, as promising as these findings are, the data also shows a key problem, which is 
that civic messaging is not widely spread. Less than 15% of the sample has ever engaged in 
civic messaging. Compared to the wide reach of TV news (over 80% report to watch TV news 
at least once a week), this is a rather small share. Given that watching TV news has no 
significant impact on an increase in internal efficacy, I can conclude that a large share of 
young adults today does not use news media in a way that fosters internal political efficacy. 
This might explain the declining levels of turnout among young voters in Netherlands and 
elsewhere in recent years (CBS). On the other hand, these results also indicate that European 
adolescents are not as “tuned out” as their American counterparts (Mindich, 2005). Even 
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though it had no impact on change in internal efficacy, at least over 80% report to follow the 
news on TV on a regular bases. 
Turning to the effect of internal efficacy on turnout my results echo recent finding 
from the United States (Glasford, 2008): Internal efficacy is a key driver of turnout in 
elections at a young age. As political involvement in the first elections has a strong socializing 
effect (Sears & Valentino, 1997) and predetermines political engagement throughout the life 
course, it becomes apparent why understanding the pathway to political participation is so 
important. If young citizens are socialized in a way that leaves them feeling competent 
enough to take an electoral decision when it is their first time to vote, they are likely to 
become engaged citizens throughout their life. 
This implies that measures aimed at increasing the low turnout rates among young 
voters, could be effective, if they are intended to foster young citizen‟s confidence in their 
understanding of politics. This could be achieved through political education in schools, but 
also through media education. However, it would not be enough to simply prescribe the 
young to use the news. In this study it has become apparent that the degree to which the user 
is involved in the message is of crucial relevance. Furthermore, research has shown that the 
topic and other characteristics of the news also have an impact on potential effects. 
Strategically framed news, for example, is likely to raise political cynicism among the young 
and can ultimately lead to a refusal of major policy decisions taken by the government 
(Elenbaas, & de Vreese, 2008). News media content of high relevance to the young like 
coverage of developments in education policy, on the other hand, is likely to increase internal 
political efficacy because mediated information is processed more efficiently if it relates to 
the everyday life of an individual (Fisch, 2009; see also chapter 5). 
The models presented in this chapter are based on panel data collected over the course 
of over two years. This has advantages as well as disadvantages. One of the main 
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disadvantages of collecting panel data among such a young age group is that the panel 
attrition is relatively high. Over the course of two years we have lost more than half of the 
respondents. And even though that has not lead to significantly different demographic 
composition of the panel, there is no certainty that there is no significant systematic attrition 
with regard to my dependent and independent variables. On the other hand, panel data provide 
the unique opportunity to study change in a dependent variable rather than a status at a 
specific point in time. Hence, if a relationship is found we can be confident that it is not a 
spurious correlation caused by a third unobserved variable. If I had analyzed just a singular 
wave of my study, there would have been strong significant relationships of all of news use 
variables and internal political efficacy.  
A two year time frame during late adolescents (age 16 to 18) provides an interesting 
insight into political socialization processes during formative years. However, we know that 
the process of political socialization starts at a much younger age and continues throughout 
the life course (Sears & Levy, 2003). In order to get a full picture of the processes and 
mechanisms future research should extend the longitudinal scope even more.   
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Chapter 5: Casting a Political Idol? A TV Casting Show for a Political Party and Its 
Effects on Adolescents 
 
Manuscript under review 
 
Abstract 
This chapter presents the results of a study of the effects of targeted political 
information aimed to increase political involvement of adolescents. In the discussion 
concerning the lack of political engagement of adolescents the media are usually regarded as 
part of the problem rather than a potential solution. Based on OLS regression analysis 
preformed on data collected among a representative sample of 15-18 year olds in the 
Netherlands (N=1653) this study shows that exposure to targeted media content can increase 
adolescents political engagement significantly, especially among those who show low 
political interest. To achieve this effect the program deals with topics relevant for the target 
group, young protagonists, and offers various opportunities to become politically active on- 
and offline. The results are discussed in the light of recent developments in the field of media 
malaise theory and the media‟s potential to engage the youth in politics. 
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Adolescents‟ general lack of political interest and engagement of adolescents has been 
a point of concern in the scientific world and beyond (Putnam 2000; Delli Carpini 2000). 
Compared to older cohorts teenagers are less likely to engage in political initiatives, in 
particular traditional conventional politics (voting, party membership, volunteering in 
political campaigns, Norris, 2003); and show little interest in current events (Mindich, 2005; 
Patterson, 2007), even if the information is presented in the new media (Subrahmanyam et 
al., 2001).  
Although most of the empirical evidence in the field originates from the USA, 
European studies indicate that the phenomenon might be universal to the Western established 
democracies. In Germany, adolescents are less likely to engage in political parties 
(Niedermayer, 2006) or even to develop a preference for one (Mößner, 2006). Henn and 
Weinstein (2006) observe a comparable alienation of adolescents from politics in the UK. In 
the Netherlands Spangenberg and Lampert (2009) concluded that adolescents have turned 
their back on societal responsibilities and called them “unlimited” generation, after 
comparing repeated cross-sectional data of a representative sample of the population.  
The consequences for democracy of this development are severe, as political attitudes 
developed in preadolescence and adolescence are likely to persist over the life course (Prior, 
2010; Sears & Levy, 2003). In a worst case scenario, this means that the generation which is 
growing up in the first decennium of the 21
st
 century will remain distant to the political 
realm, implying that a large share will exclude themselves from processes of political 
decision making during their entire life. 
However, there is also evidence to the opposite: In the past two elections in the USA, 
the participation of young voters increased for the first time in almost twenty years (CIRCLE) 
and adolescents are more likely to engage in voluntary community service than their parent 
generation at their age (Sears & Levy, 2003). Nevertheless, the majority of the empirical 
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evidence concerning the political engagement and integration of adolescents points to the 
conclusion that the youth of today is “tuned out” (Mindich, 2005). Although the distance of 
adolescents from politics and the potential consequences have been studied elaborately, there 
are very few studies that propose solutions to the problem. This study fills this gap by 
investigating in how far targeted political information in form of a TV program meant for a 
young audience can overcome the exclusion and alienation of adolescents from the political 
world. In this regard this chapter is different to the two previous chapters of this dissertation. 
Whereas these chapters were dedicated to analyze patterns and dynamics of media effects in a 
standard situation, this study takes the form of an intervention study in which the effects of an 
intended deviation from the “normal” media use situation is investigated. 
The media as cause of the political alienation of adolescents 
In the discussion concerning adolescent‟s lack of political interest and motivation to 
participate, the media are usually not considered to be part of the solution. On the contrary, 
the mass media are often even blamed to be partially responsible for the political alienation of 
the young.  
In the academic debate this claim is substantiated using three lines of reasoning that 
linking exposure to media content and lack of political engagement. The first is a time budget 
argument (Putnam, 2000): Teenagers spend more time using media than any other cohort on 
an average day, 8 hours on an average day (Strasburger, Wilson, & Jordan, 2009). In fact, 
they spend more time using media than in school (Huntemann & Morgan, 2001). Moreover, 
they are more likely to do so for entertainment or recreational purposes (Shah, Kwak, & 
Holbert, 2001). That means that the amount of time that could be spent on political 
information, let alone civic or political engagement is cut short. Hence, according to this 
argument, exposure to media does not actively change adolescent‟s attitudes towards politics, 
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but takes up time that could have been invested in activities that stimulate political 
engagement otherwise. However, this line of reasoning has been contested. In a survey of 
1501 14 to 22 year olds Pasek et al. (2006) observe that this argument holds only for heavy 
users of media content. Occasional media use, even if it is completely unrelated to politics, 
facilitates political engagement of a young audience in this study. 
The second argument concerns the effect of a general negative style of reporting in 
the coverage of politics. In line with media malaise theory (for an overview see Holtz-Bacha, 
1990), the key notion of this argument is that politics are often presented in a negative light, 
as coverage on politics tends to focus on conflict and scandals and the Machiavellian game of 
power rather than issue-oriented policy debates. Being confronted with the failures instead of 
the virtues of politics the audience becomes more and more cynical towards politics and 
ultimately refrains from engagement in the political world (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Yet 
there is empirical evidence that the theory does not hold for adolescents to full extent. 
Elenbaas and de Vreese (2008) studied the effects of exposure to strategy framed media 
content among adolescents and observed a significant effect on the level of cynicism. The 
more strategy-framed news adolescents encounter, the more cynical they become towards the 
political system. However, higher levels of cynicism did not translate into lack of political 
engagement. On the contrary, it has been repeatedly shown that news use affects adolescents‟ 
political interest and engagement positively (Esser & de Vreese, 2007; Holtz-Bacha, 1990). 
The third and last line of reasoning, the exclusion argument, is specific to the situation 
of adolescents in the political system and therefore particularly valid. According to this 
theory the alienation of adolescents from politics is a result of their exclusion from the 
political world. This idea was first put forward by Katz (1993) in an article in the Rolling 
Stone magazine. Buckingham (1998) revisited the idea and developed it further. He specified 
two dimensions of exclusion from politics of the youth: the system and the communication 
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dimension. The system dimension concerns minors‟ exclusion from institutional political 
power in democratic systems. Adolescents, who have not reached voting age, are omitted 
from all formal decision making processes, e.g. voting and petitions. They are, therefore, an 
unattractive target group for decision makers as policy concessions to minors cannot directly 
translate into electoral support. This has two consequences: a) policy issues that are first and 
foremost relevant to adolescents are often not on the agenda and b) political decisions are 
frequently not taken in favor of this particular age group. 
The second dimension regards the communication of politics. Again, the exclusion of 
minors from the public debate is twofold: First, young voices are excluded in the news as 
protagonists, in the form of interviews or talk shows; and second, the language of political 
debates frequently incomprehensible to a young audience. That means that the presentation of 
news and current affairs in the media does not match the style and taste of adolescents. In 
other words, the youth of today is „tuned out‟ because the media do not offer political 
information on their wave-length.  
In this chapter I investigate whether a change in the communication of politics is able 
to include minors. If adolescents are featured in a political information outlet as important 
and relevant political actors and the focus is on topics relevant to the age group, can this 
affect the integration of minors in the political system? If the exclusion of minors from news 
and the public debate about politics in terms of protagonists, language and style is in fact part 
of the reason for their alienation from the political world as Buckingham (1997) argues, will 
an explicit inclusion in a political TV show affect the political engagement of adolescents 
positively?  
Inclusive TV programming for adolescents 
The ideal of an inclusive political TV show according to Buckingam‟s standards would 
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appeal to a young audience in more ways than merely including them in the political debate 
and process. A program that matches young taste with regard to protagonists, topics and style 
triggers several mechanisms of media effects that are known in the literature. 
Young and attractive protagonists enable positive identification with the characters on 
television for the audience. This, on the other hand, stimulates model learning according to 
Social Cognitive Theory developed by Bandura (2009). According to this theory observed 
behavior in the media trigger learning mechanisms on concrete as well as abstract levels. 
Identification with the model is a positive moderator in this process. The more an individual 
feels connected to a model in the media, the more likely an imitation of the observed 
behavior becomes. Therefore we can expect that TV programs that feature young 
protagonists that engage in politics stimulate those viewers that identify with them to become 
active themselves. 
The second feature of an inclusive TV program is content that is both interesting and 
relevant for a young audience. By focusing on issues close to the reality of adolescents 
information about politics becomes more approachable and understandable. According to 
theories that explain processing mechanisms of information processing (Fisch, 2009), 
adolescents are more likely to understand and learn from information transmitted through 
mass media if it relates to issues that are familiar to them. The reason is that information is 
usually processed through already established cognitive links. The more links to new 
information individuals have, the better they are able to process it. That means that political 
TV programs that deal with topics and problems adolescents know and care about are much 
more likely to be remembered and processed. 
Finally, the “young” style and language of an ideal inclusive TV program can 
contribute to enhanced memory of the content and potential changes in the behavior of the 
audience. This can be explained by relying on theoretical work in the field of advertisement 
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research (Gleich, 2000). Style elements such as music, staging and editing influence the 
mood of the audience, which increases – in turn – the likelihood that the presented 
information is memorized and positively evaluated.  
These three features, young protagonists, topics relevant and interesting for a young 
audience, and young style and editing were key elements of the targeted political information 
program Lijst 0, which is investigated in this chapter. 
Targeted political information program: Lijst 0 
The targeted political information program investigated in this chapter is called “Lijst 0” was 
a series of eight episodes of a political TV program broadcasted prior to the Dutch 
parliamentary elections in 2010. The series featured the foundation of a political party for 
young people. In the first episodes the front runner of the party was determined in an 
American Idol like competition and the audience was invited to vote for their favorite 
candidate using telephone text messaging (SMS). After the audience had decided on a 
frontrunner, the producers of the program supported the candidate in founding a political 
party. In the subsequent episodes the audience followed the steps of the party which was 
formally running in the general elections in the same year. For example, one of the first tasks 
of the newly elected frontrunner, Lot Feijens, was to find a name for the new party. Feijens 
called the party Lijst 17, which referred to the name of the TV program (Lijst 0) as well as 
their position on the ballot. The next episodes covered other pivotal elements of the election 
campaign of the party: the founding assembly, the formal registration, the first press 
conference, the discussion and decision on the party manifesto, the election campaign and 
finally Election Day. Besides the coverage of the upcoming party called “Lijst 17”, the most 
popular established parties were also part of the program, mostly in form of a quiz in which 
the front runner had to answer youth related questions to determine his or her “real age”. 
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Moreover, the producers of the program also organized a televised public debate a few days 
prior to the election in a popular club in Amsterdam in which the frontrunners of the most 
popular established parties and of “Lijst 17” answered the questions of a young audience. 
The program had an average audience share of 8,5% of young adults (20 – 34), which 
is a little below average for political information programs in the Netherlands (van Baars & 
Zandbergen, 2010). In the general elections the party founded in the program received 7456 
votes, one eighth of what is needed to win a seat in the parliament. 
Despite its mediocre success in terms of audience and election results the program is a 
good example of a program that overcomes exclusion of the youth in the communication of 
politics not only because it features young topics and protagonists. The concept of the 
program went beyond mere broadcasting of information, and tried to mobilize its audience to 
engage in politics both off- and online. To give a few examples: Over the course of the TV 
series the party Lijst 17 organized several demonstrations and rallies, which were advertised 
via Facebook, a Dutch social networking site called Hyves and on Twitter. The public debate 
with the frontrunners was publically accessible as were the constitutional meeting of the party 
and the audience was invited to come. The most significant feature of interactivity was that 
the audience could vote for the protagonists of the show in the actual elections. Additionally, 
there were ample opportunities to discuss the candidates and issues of the show online, either 
directly with the candidates through their twitter account and social network sites, or on a 
more general level via the homepage and twitter account of the TV program. 
Hypotheses 
Based on the three different theories linking adolescents media exposure to political 
involvement mentioned above, I expect to find effects of exposure to the targeted political 
information program on two levels a) political cynicism, b) political engagement. 
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Political cynicism 
The reception of the TV program in the Dutch media was mixed. Although the effort to 
actively engage adolescents in politics was generally appreciated, there were also concerns 
whether the “young” and somewhat silly style of the program degraded politics and portrayed 
protagonists who were anything but role model politicians. In the words of media critic Hans 
Beerekamp (translated by the author): 
After the jury has sent the only candidate that presented a story with content 
home, because she was “too serious” (and on top of that she had brought her father 
to the show and wore the wrong clothes), the remaining candidates are rather vague: 
two girls that took of part of their clothes because all young people are “standing in 
their shirt”, one depressive dopehaed and a few candidates with experience in the 
student union ….19 
These concerns are in line with a broader discussion in the literature, namely in the media 
malaise debate. According to Putnam (2000), Cappella & Jamieson (1997) and other 
advocates of this theory, the scandal and focus orientation of the media present leads to a 
portrayal of the political world that leaves the audience to believe that politicians care 
primarily about themselves and their position rather than the public good. Therefore the 
media are directly responsible for rising levels of political cynicism. This especially holds for 
media content that is cynical or satirical about politics (Guggenheim, Kwak, & Campbell, 
2011).  
The targeted political information program studied in this chapter should be no exception to 
this rule. The front runner of Lijst 17 was chosen by telephone vote, after presenting her 
political standpoint in underwear. Her competitors sang or danced during the audition. All of 
this might have fueled the perception, that it does not need a strong character or knowledge to 
                                                 
19 Published in NRC Handelsblad, 26.4.2010: Zapikliklees: Niet alle jongeren staan in hun hemd. 
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become a politician. The emphasis on presentation rather than content of politics continued 
during the whole show. Therefore I expect to find that exposure to the targeted political 
information program lead to an increase in political cynicism. 
H1: Exposure to the targeted political information program leads to higher levels of political 
cynicism. 
Political engagement 
Whereas exposure to targeted political information is expected to have negative influence in 
terms of political cynicism, I expect to find a positive impact on political engagement. 
Research in the field has shown that this is not necessarily contradictory (De Vreese & 
Semetko 2002). The hypothesis can be substantiated with Buckingham‟s (1997) idea of 
exclusion as cause for political alienation. As pointed out earlier, the targeted political 
information program was in style, language and approach youth-oriented and therefore able 
to bypass the exclusion problems of traditional political information programs. These 
programs fail to include topics that are relevant for a young audience as well as to present 
information in a language that is interesting and understandable for adolescents (Katz, 1993). 
Where traditional political information programs exclude, the targeted political information 
program tried to include the youth in various ways to inform them about their possibilities to 
be part of the political process. Therefore, I expect to find mobilizing effects of the targeted 
political information on its audience, not only in terms of turnout. The program also 
presented a wide range of possibilities to engage in democracy in alternative ways: to discuss 
politics online, engage in demonstrations or actively contribute to a political party. As the 
largest part of the sample has not reached voting age yet, the focus of this chapter is on 
alternative ways of democratic participation. 
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H2: Exposure to the targeted political information program leads to higher levels of political 
engagement. 
Besides testing the predictions of the media malaise and exclusion argument, I am also 
interested in the causal ordering of relations between media use and in particular to the 
targeted political information program and political engagement
20
. Specifically, traditional 
news use and the exposure to the targeted political information program are being related to 
each other. Two scenarios are possible. Either the influence of both sources is completely 
unrelated to each other, or, probably more likely, exposure to the targeted political 
information program mediates the effects of exposure to traditional news use. That would 
mean that news exposure affects the likelihood of exposure to the targeted political 
information program, which in turn affects political engagement. In other words, it could be 
that only those who already follow the news take an interest in the program, which causes a 
potential change in political engagement (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Full mediation would 
imply that there would be no relationship between news use and political engagement when 
exposure to the targeted political information program is controlled. More likely in this 
particular case is a partial mediation, implying that there are direct effects of news use on 
political engagement as well as there are indirect effects through exposure to the targeted 
political information program. 
RQ1: How does general news use relate to exposure to the targeted political information 
program? 
A second specification of the model is relevant in the context of this analysis. Coleman 
(2008) expressed concerns that media interventions aimed to include adolescents in the public 
political debate would only reach those who are already information-rich and from a well-off 
                                                 
20
 It should be noted that the direction of causality in this case is likely to be two directional (see Capter 
3). Yet, this cannot be considered in the model due to data constraints. I therefore make no claims regarding the 
direction of causality, but about the causal path through mediation. 
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background, this concern is comparable to the theory of the knowledge gap as explained in 
Chapter 3. That would mean that targeted political information programs, even if succeeding, 
only reach those who need it the least and would contribute to an information gap between 
the well and the bad educated. To empirically investigate this concern several interaction 
effects of socio-demographic as well as attitudinal variables are being tested. I expect to find 
that the information-rich are more likely to benefit from exposure to the targeted political 
information program. 
H3: The relationship between exposure to the targeted political information program and 
political engagement is moderated by education, social class, and political interest. 
Control variables 
Besides the socio-economic background of the respondent, there are two important control 
variables which will be included in the analytical models. The first is the educational 
background of the parents. This variable is included to account for potential effects of the 
discussion culture at home (Percheron & Jennings, 1981). The second included control 
variable is political interest. Arguably, political interest could also be treated as a dependent 
or at least a mediating variable in this context. The reason why I include it as an independent 
variable is to account for self-selection effects of media use. In many cases, the causal 
relationship between any form media use and political attitudes or behavior is double-sided 
and takes the form of a spiral of influence (Slater, 2007). In this case this means that those 
who are politically interested tend to use media outlets covering political information which 
in return increases their political interest. To fully uncover the causal relationship between 
political interest and political information use longitudinal panel data is needed, which is not 
available in this case. Therefore political interest is statistically controlled to achieve a 
conservative test of the hypotheses. 
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Method 
To test the influence of the targeted political information program on political cynicism and 
political engagement, I rely on a post-test-only quasi-experimental research design. The data 
was collected through CAWI interviews of a representative
21
 sample of the Dutch population 
age 15 to 18. The questionnaire contained about 60 questions concerning political 
engagement, media use, and background variables. Respondents took on average 30 minutes 
to complete. The field period of the research lasted from 16.06.2010 to 11.07.2010, and took 
place directly after the elections of 2010 and the last episode of the targeted political 
information program. In total 1653 respondents participated in the survey, the response rate 
was 70%.  
Operationalization 
Dependent and independent variables are measured using established scales as far as 
possible, although some had to be adapted to the situation of an adolescent population. 
Political cynicism was measured using a shortened version of the Cappella & Jamieson 
(1997) measures (“Politicians deliberately promise more than they can deliver.”, “Politicians 
primarily look out for their own interests.” “You are more likely to win a seat in Parliament 
through the influence of your political friends than based on your capabilities”, “Government 
officials do not care what people like you think”, Cronbach‟s Alpha: .95, M: 3.50, SE: .02 ). 
All items were measured on a 7 point scale. Contrary to the second chapter of this 
dissertation in which I studied media effects on political trust, I investigate effects on 
cynicism. Although these concepts should not simply be considered to be two ends of an uni-
dimensional continuum they are certainly related to one another.  
                                                 
21 The sample was provided by a professional opinion research institute (GfK). They administer an existing representative 
sample of the Dutch population from which the respondents in this survey were drawn.  
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Political engagement was measured as a cumulative scale of engagement in various political 
activities (Cronbach‟s Alpha: .85, M: .17, SE: .005) : a) offline: Boycott or buycott a product 
for political reasons, participate in student or other elections, demonstrate, write or political 
messages on walls, collect signatures, participate in a campaign rally or engage in an election 
campaign, donate money or collect donations, wear a t-shirt with a political message b) 
online: Post a political message or video on a social networking site, chat or twitter about a 
political subject, sign an online petition, participate in a political discussion online, use an 
electronic election advisor, organize an online discussion or petition, join a cause on 
facebook, forward a video or link with a political message, blog about politics, send an e-mail 
to a politician. Each item was measured on a 3 point scale (never, sometimes, and 
frequently).  
General interest in news was measured using a weighted measure of exposure to a 
number of Dutch news outlets in a typical week (0-7)
22
 (Cronbach‟s Alpha: .79, M: 3.50, SE: 
.09). The raw scores were weighted by an attention measure (“When you are using one of the 
news outlet, do you use them with a lot of attention or rather in passing”). Weighting the 
attention measure served two purposes: a) it accounts for demands to include attention 
measures in measurements of media exposure and b) the attention measure turned out to be 
higher for news outlets that provide in depth information, which means that they have 
stronger influence on the absolute measure, which increases the validity of the general 
measure. Exposure to the targeted political information program was measured by a 
dichotomous variable. Respondents who had seen the program at least once received a value 
of 1, all other respondents received a value of 0. 
                                                 
22 The individual exposure measures where weighted to account for difference in publication intervals. 
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To analyze the data I used Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis. Besides the 
variables mentioned above I included educational background
23
, the political education 
program in their schools
24
, the formal education of their mother
25
, age, gender, social class
26
, 
and political interest
27
 as control variables.  
Results 
Of all 1653 respondents 280 (17%) had seen the targeted political information program at 
least once. The audience in the sample was generally satisfied with the program. 64% of the 
280 respondents liked it, and only 15 % of the audience thought it was boring. 25% claimed 
that they had thought about electing the party founded in the program. Yet, only 40% agreed 
to the statement that they had learned something about election campaigns, and 13% could 
imagine participating in future editions of the program. With regard to the discussion 
concerning whether or not the program has contributed to political cynicism it is interesting 
to note that 44% of the audience agreed to the statement that ”the candidates of the show are 
not ready to be politicians”.  
                                                 
23 Measured by an ordinal scale indicating the highest level of education they are currently enrolled in. 
24 Measured by an cumulative scale of four items (Cronbach‟s Alpha: 0.75, M: 3.37, SE: .03): Teachers encourage us to 
discuss about political or social problems in school, students feel free to disagree with teachers when debating political or 
social issues, the school organizes political debates, test elections or political role games, the school organizes excursions to 
political institutions. All items were measured on a 7 point scale from 1 to 7. 
25 Measured by an ordinal scale measuring the highest level of education completed. We chose to only include the formal 
education of the mother in the model to avoid distortions of heterogenous living situations in patch-work families. 
26 Measured by asking for the social class of the respondent directly. It would have been preferable to ask for household 
income rather than the social class to avoid  asocial desirability bias, but previous studies in the field have shown that minors 
frequently do not know their household income. 
27 Measured on a 7 point scale (Question wording: “Generally speaking, how interested are you in politics?”) 
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However, OLS regression analysis revealed that exposure to the targeted political 
information program did not significantly influence political cynicism, as Hypothesis 1 
expected.  
Table 5.1: Summary of OLS Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Political Cynicism 
(N = 1653) 
 Political Cynicism 
Variable B SE B Β 
Age  - 0.01  0.025  -.01 
Gender  - 0.17  0.055  -.07** 
Social Class 0.17 0.036  .12** 
Political Education - 0.03 0.022 -.03 
Education -0.001 0.002 -.01 
Parental Education -0.08 0.032 -.06* 
Political Interest -0.04 0.018 -.079* 
Targeted political information exp. -0.05 0.076 -.01 
Hard news exp. -0.007 0.008 -.02 
Intercept 4.12** .46  
Adjusted R
2 
.04 
8.76** F  
Note: *p  <  .05.  **p  <  .01. 
With regard to the influence of the targeted political information program on political 
engagement, the results do support my expectations. Table 5.2 presents the results of the 
regression analysis predicting political engagement.  
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Table 5.2: Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Political 
Engagement (N = 1594) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE B Β B SE B β 
Age   0.01  0.004  .08**   0.02  0.004  .08** 
Gender  0.01  0.008  .03  0.01  0.008  .03 
Social Class -0.01 0.005 -.02 -0.04 0.006 -.02 
Political Education 0.03 0.003 .18** 0.03 0.0003 .18** 
Education 0.00 0.005 .03 0.00 0.005 .03 
Parental Education 0.003 0.005 .02 0.00 0.003 .02 
Political Interest 0.02 0.003 .19** 0.02 0.003 .19** 
Targeted political information exp. 0.03 0.012 .05** 0.03 0.027 .05** 
Hard news exp. 0.01 0.001 .28** 0.01 0.001 .28** 
Pol. interest * Targeted political information exp.    -.013 0.007 -.10* 
Intercept -0.30** .074     
Adjusted R
2 
.266 
2.87 
.268 
8.94** F  
Note: *p  <  .05.  **p  <  .01., significance of the moderator is tested one sided 
The model has a good fit, as it is able to explain 26% of the variance of the dependent 
variable. The table shows that exposure to the targeted political information program has a 
highly significant influence on political engagement. This means that the data supports 
Hypothesis 2 that watching the targeted political information program is positively related to 
political involvement of adolescents. Additional analysis revealed that those who had 
watched the targeted political information are predicted to involve in 0.8 political activities 
more compared to those who had not. Of the 26 kind of political activities I included in the 
measure of political engagement online activities show the highest correlation to exposure to 
 111 
 
the targeted political information program: using an electronic election aid (r: .21), sign an 
online petition (r: .14), chat about politics (r: .14), join a cause on facebook (r: .12).  
Two additional questions were posed concerning the causal mechanism that is at play: 
the first concerned potential mediation of effects of general news and the second interaction 
effects of socio-demographic factors and attitudinal variables.  
Figure 5.1. Mediation effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 presents the results of the mediation analysis that was carried out using the 
SPSS macros of Preacher and Hayes (2004). The total effect of hard news use on the 
dependent variable is beta: 0.51, which consist of the direct effect (beta: 0.31) and the indirect 
effect through exposure to exposure to the targeted political information program (beta: 0.2). 
The statistical significance of the latter effect was estimated using bootstrapping (2000 
resamples). As there is still a significant direct effect, there is no evidence of a full mediation. 
The findings do imply, however, a partial mediation. 
News exposure Political engagement 
Targeted political 
information exposure 
β = .02 
p = .000 
β = 1.38 
p = .000 
Direct effect: 
β = 0.31 p = .009 
Indirect effect: 
β = 0.2 p = .000 
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With regard to the expected interaction effects (H3) the results are mixed. There is no 
empirical evidence for interaction effects of social class, education, or parental education and 
exposure to the targeted political information program. I did, however, find a significant 
interaction effect for political interest and exposure to the targeted political information 
program, however not in the expected direction. According to the analysis presented in table 
2, those adolescents who show little political interest benefit the most from the program in 
terms of political engagement (see also Figure 5.2).  
Figure 5.2: Interaction effect 
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Discussion 
In this chapter I investigated how and to what degree a media targeted political information 
program can influence the political involvement of adolescents. This is particularly relevant, 
as the involvement of adolescents in traditional expressions of citizenship is decreasing in the 
United States as well as in Europe. The role of the media in this process is usually not 
regarded as a very positive one, because using media takes up time that could be spend on 
political activities otherwise (Shah et al., 2001), the media present politics as a strategic 
power play rather than as policy debates that are crucial to modern societies (Cappella 
& Jamieson, 1997), and they exclude young citizens in various ways (Buckingham, 1997; 
Katz, 1993).  
The analysis presented in this chapter shows that a TV program that uses a young 
content, style and protagonists can influence the political involvement in a positive way 
without increasing their political cynicism. The latter was a concern since the program 
showed several features of a political information program that has been related to political 
cynicism in previous research (Elenbaas & de Vreese, 2008; Putnam, 2000): it focused on the 
competition rather than on the content of politics, it was highly personalized and the political 
staff was not presented as very competent. Still, according to the analysis, there was no 
significant effect of exposure to List 0 on political cynicism. However, it should be noted that 
the results should be interpreted with caution as there is still room to improve the 
specification of the model.  
The second model explaining political engagement has a much better model fit and 
shows that the targeted political information program has indeed fulfilled a mobilizing 
function. Those adolescents who had watched the program showed a higher level of political 
engagement, in particular online engagement. This means that the exclusion of minors from 
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the political debate can be overcome by adjusting the political debate and offering targeted 
specific media content, at least in part. Moreover, the effect of the program was the strongest 
for those who are normally show only little interest in politics. This means that the program 
did not only reach the information-rich as Coleman (2008) feared, but inspired exactly those 
who are usually not at the forefront of political engagement. This finding is particularly 
interesting in the light of the knowledge gap debate. According to many studies in the field 
(for an overview see Eveland & Scheufele 2000), traditional news are most effective in terms 
of political mobilization and learning, for those viewers who already care the most about 
politics, high educated, wealthy media users. This implies that news media contribute to a 
knowledge and participation gap between the information-rich and information-poor, and 
also a skewed representation of the population in politics. These findings mean that adjusting 
political information to be more inclusive of young topics and protagonist can help to bridge 
the gap when it is still in phase of emergence.  
Yet, the effectiveness of the targeted political information program did not mean that 
traditional sources of political information became irrelevant for political mobilization. On 
the contrary, traditional news outlets had a strong and positive impact on political 
engagement implying that watching the news on television or reading the newspaper inspired 
the youth to actively engage too. It also inspired the respondents in the sample to watch the 
targeted political information program which lead in turn to an even higher degree of 
mobilization. Therefore, I do not claim that traditional news outlets should change and 
become more youth-oriented to include young audiences. Instead, I recommend adding 
complementary “young” political information outlets to the existing news landscape. The 
findings of this study suggest that it is the variety of media offers that inspires and mobilizes 
the youth. 
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However, when interpreting the results it is important to note that there are significant 
data constraints that imply that we need to be cautious in reading too much into the results. 
The most important constraint is that this chapter presents the results of a study of media 
effects of one specific program using cross-sectional data. In order to be sure that the 
causality runs in the expected direction and is correctly attributed to use of this program it 
would have been beneficial to apply a 2x2 experimental design instead of a post-test only 
experimental design. The results would arguably be more convincing if I could prove through 
pre-test data that users of the targeted information program have indeed engaged more in 
politics compared to non-users. This way, the possibility of self-selection would have been 
eliminated. According to the results with regard to the development of political knowledge, 
self-selection is a very likely scenario, implying that those who were more likely to engage in 
the first place are also the ones using the program. However, controlling for political interest 
did solve this problem in part.  
Second, as this study of media effects is not conducted in a laboratory environment, 
we cannot be sure that political engagement is in fact a consequence of use of this one 
specific TV program. Other events that have taken place in this time frame might have caused 
adolescents to become engaged in politics. However, this would not explain a significantly 
different level of engagement between users of the program and non-users of the program as 
these events could have affected both groups. 
Still, despite its positive effects, targeted political information programs like Lijst 0 
are not the universal solution to all problems connected to the failure of political socialization 
of adolescents in the past decades. First of all because, even though the program had reached 
17% of the sample, there are 83% left who did not tune in and therefore could not benefit 
from the positive effects of the program. They remain excluded, and it is unlikely that more 
and other media interventions will reach them. Secondly, a program like Lijst 17 is not 
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suitable to inform and explain all kinds of political issues. It worked in the very particular 
context of a national general election campaign, which is a period in which political issues 
are both relevant and exciting due to the competition of the parties. When it comes to the 
everyday life of politics and the task of the media is primarily to inform about complex policy 
issues like alternatives in measures to the integration of foreigners or the budget, a different 
approach is needed to reach the youth. A 19 year old protagonist without a political 
background who hardly understands the problems herself might not be as suitable to present 
the issues in this context. Finally, the rather small size of the effect should be noted. Although 
participation in one additional political activity is a considerable improvement, it is not 
enough to consolidate an attitude of active citizenship. This is where other agents of political 
socialization (Sears and Levy, 2003) come in, in particular political education at school. In 
my analysis this factor proved to be the single most important agent in stimulating political 
engagement, far more important that the level of formal education of the respondents and 
their parents. 
To summarize the results of this chapter and answer the research question, whether a 
media targeted political information program can overcome the political alienation of the 
youth from politics: The answer is yes it can. But only as part of a general political education 
of adolescents to which parents, and more importantly the schools need to contribute to as 
well. In a scenario in which minors are sensitized for their role in democracy by schools and 
parents, a TV program that shows them how they can make their voice heard in a democratic 
political system and provides them with various opportunities to do so, can thrive even more 
than the example presented in this chapter.  
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Chapter 6: General conclusion  
In times of dwindling turnout rates among young voters and a growing gap between 
traditional politics and the young, understanding the process of political socialization is 
possibly more important than ever. Yet, the youth‟s alienation from politics leaves us puzzled. 
We neither fully comprehend what keeps adolescents from politics, nor do we have a 
convincing plan in place to overcome the distance between politics and the young. Especially 
the role of the media needs to be investigated thoroughly, as it has been neglected by science 
despite its prominence in the everyday lives of adolescents. In this dissertation I shed a light 
on the question if and how media can influence the process of political socialization by 
investigating three aspects of the process: the development of political attitudes, political 
knowledge, and political engagement. I provide evidence that media can contribute to growth 
in political knowledge and mobilize political engagement, depending on media content and 
characteristics of the users. Thereby this dissertation contributes to the field of media effects 
research, as well as ongoing political socialization research in the social sciences. 
In this final I chapter I will first give a brief overview of the findings. In the second 
part of this final chapter I focus on a number of overarching key conclusions and their 
implications for future research as well as media policy. 
Summary of findings 
The first empirical study of this dissertation served the purpose to place the subsequent 
studies into context by comparing the demographic group investigated in this dissertation – 
Dutch adolescents – to European adolescents and older media users using multi-level 
regression modeling based on European Social Survey data. From a system level perspective I 
find that media effects do not vary greatly across Europe. I did find, however, that countries 
characterized by a consolidated and mature democracy, like the Netherlands, are more likely 
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to bring about engaged young citizens than countries in which democracy less developed. 
With regard to the second comparative perspective I find that media effects on political 
attitudes, in particular attachment to a political party and political trust, and political 
participation become stronger with age. For adolescents these effects were statistically 
insignificant or just about significant. So why should we study media effects among a group 
which is hardly developed? The answer is already hidden in the question itself: Because it 
allows us to study the dynamics of the development of media influence on political 
socialization. As media effects are best conceptualized as mutually self-reinforcing spirals 
(Slater, 2007), it is particularly interesting to analyze the stage at which this spiraling process 
begins, to understand the mechanism and opportunities to stimulate the process. 
In the second empirical study (Chapter 3) I set out to do so by undertaking an in-depth 
analysis of such a self-reinforcing spiral using Structural Equation Modeling on three wave 
panel data. Focusing on growth in political knowledge and news use I provide evidence that 
the starting point of the spiral is rather located on the side of political knowledge than news 
use. News use, on the other hand, does contribute to political learning over time, independent 
of the background characteristics of the user.  
In Chapter 4 this argument is taken one step further: from political knowledge to the effect of 
being informed, or rather the perception that one is knowledgeable about politics. Here I 
present the results of a study that investigates causes and effects of internal efficacy or the 
perception that one is informed enough about what is going on in politics and capable to 
participate in the political process. Using data from all four panel waves I analyze news media 
influence on the development of internal efficacy not as one bulk of information, but 
differentiate between different types of media sources and level of involvement of the users. I 
find that whereas TV news use has no effect on growth in internal political efficacy, reading 
newspapers and using classic (non-interactive) online news sources has a positive impact on 
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political efficacy. The strongest effect, however, is found for interactive online media that 
require users to participate in message creation. 
In the final study, presented in Chapter 5, I am interested in finding out if targeted media 
content can be strategically used to stimulate political participation among the young in a real-
world scenario. I do this by studying the effects of exposure to a specific political information 
program, that fulfilled a number of criteria that have been theorized to be effective, on a 
young audience. The findings imply that a program specifically designed to be relevant for a 
young audience in style and content can in fact mobilize the young, independent and 
additional to effects of classic news use. A second noteworthy finding is that despite its 
somewhat „silly‟ presentation of politics, watching the program did not affect the level of 
cynicism. Finally, the effects on mobilization were strongest among those viewers that had the 
lowest level of political interest, implying that such formats can be a first step to bridge the 
gap between those who are knowledgeable, interested and likely to participate and those 
adolescents who are disengaged from politics. 
Key conclusions and discussion 
In this dissertation I posed the question whether media play a very prominent role in 
the process of political socialization, given that the influence of other agents of political 
socialization, most notably parents, has changed or even diminished over the past decades. 
According to the findings of my studies, the answer to this question has to be “no” at first 
sight. The size of the effects of media use, be it entertainment media, news media or even 
interactive online news sources, on political knowledge, trust, or engagement, are arguably 
small. In the case of political attitudes, like political cynicism and trust, I even find in two 
studies that it is unrelated to media use at this age, whereas there is a traceable relationship at 
later stages in life. Moreover, once I take an in depth look at the causal relationship between 
news use and a variable of political socialization, namely political knowledge, it becomes 
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apparent that the causality goes both ways, with pre-existing political knowledge being the 
stronger source of influence (see Chapter 3). 
So, does that mean that media are irrelevant to the process of political socialization? 
Again, the answer has to be no. The effects I present in this dissertation might be small, but 
their statistical significance can also not be denied. In fact, small effect sizes are common in 
studies on media effects among children and adolescents, including non-political outcome 
variables (Valkenburg & Peter, 2013; Ekström & Östman, 2013). What is even more 
important is that they mark the starting point of a life-long process of mutual influence 
between media use and political attitudes, political knowledge and political engagement (see 
Chapter 2). The role of media use in political socialization becomes particularly visible if we 
do not look at the influence of „the media‟ as one cohesive institution on the full process of 
political socialization, and instead focus on specific aspects of the process as well as specific 
media content. In the following section I will discuss specific media effects on each of the 
political outcome variables I introduced in the first chapter thereby combining the results of 
the studies presented in this dissertation. 
Political knowledge and internal efficacy 
Media are first and foremost a source of information. Therefore it is theoretically 
sensible to begin by investigating media effects on political socialization by analyzing 
political learning. Do adolescents learn about politics from the media? What seems to be a 
trivial question is in fact a very complex process. In order to learn it is not enough to simply 
be exposed to political information – the information also needs to be processed and 
remembered. Whether or not this happens and leads to the perception that one is in fact 
knowledgeable about politics depends on three factors a) how much a young person already 
knows about politics; b) the type of medium they are using; and, c) whether or not they have 
an active role in the message creation process. 
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These findings have a number of implications for political socialization and political 
communication research. Starting with the first result that growth in political knowledge and 
news use are interdependent, yet political knowledge is the more powerful factor of the two, 
especially at a younger age. This finding contributes to research on the widening knowledge 
gap between the information rich and the information poor (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000). This 
dissertation adds to the existing literature by providing evidence that the separation of those 
who benefit to a great extent from news media and those who do not, starts earlier than the 
age of fifteen. This implies that the foundation of the knowledge gap is laid out during 
childhood. This also means that childhood is the period in life during which we would have to 
start intervening in order to bridge the knowledge gap. 
Turning to the second major conclusion, differential media effects on political 
knowledge, the findings of my dissertation are very much in line with previous research on 
the matter (Frank & Kanihan, 1997), but also show that the differences in the degree to which 
TV, newspapers and online news media affect political learning have become stronger over 
the past decades. Whereas Chaffee and others found that newspaper reading had stronger 
effects on political learning than TV news, I find that adolescents do not feel that they are 
learning anything from watching TV news at all that helps them to understand politics. As TV 
news is still the most popular news source among the young, this finding means that it crucial 
to incorporate features into the general news that facilitate picking up information for 
adolescents. Such features should increase the relevance of the news presented to young 
audience: for example by reporting on topics that have a large impact on the lives of the 
young (Graber, 2001). 
Political attitudes 
Contrary to the results on political learning, I do not find any significant effects of 
media use on political attitudes among adolescents: Neither on political trust, nor the 
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proximity to a political party, nor political cynicism. Likewise, the type of media content did 
not matter: neither news use, nor entertainment media use, nor a mix between the two 
investigated in chapter 5 proved to affect political attitudes. Interestingly, I did find evidence 
of a relationship between political trust and proximity to a political party and media exposure 
for older media users in chapter 2. Similarly, Elenbaas and de Vreese (2008) find that news 
media use and political cynicism are related among a sample of young Dutch voters age 18-
24. To be specific, they find that exposure to strategic news leads to higher levels of political 
cynicism, and ultimately to a specific voting behavior. 
This finding is an addition to the research on the relationship between political 
cynicism and media use. Much like in the case of political learning the relationship between 
the two is conceptualized as a mutually self-reinforcing spiral (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). 
Those who are already cynical about politics select media content that reinforces their views 
on politics leading to increasing levels of cynicism (selective exposure). As I did not find any 
empirical traces of this spiral among adolescents, I speculate that the spiral of cynicism starts 
during late adolescence, probably in relation to participation in the first elections. However, as 
I could not match content analysis data with survey data to investigate the causal mechanism 
in detail, this conclusion should be interpreted with caution. More research is certainly needed 
to unveil the specifics of the antecedents of the spiral of cynicism. 
Political engagement and participation 
The final aspect of political socialization I analyzed in this dissertation is the 
development of political engagement. As it the key aspect of this dissertation, I investigated 
the phenomenon from a few different angles in three empirical studies. A common theme in 
the findings of these studies is that they provide evidence that media use can in fact mobilize 
the young to participate in the political process even long before they are eligible to vote. 
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A responsive well-functioning democracy is characterized by ample opportunities for 
all citizens – young and old – to play an active role during the elective cycle by making their 
voices heard, using their power as consumers, or directly getting in contact with members of 
the legislative system. These types of unconventional political participation are not exactly 
widespread among the young: yet, 72% of the respondents of the panel indicated to have 
participated in one way or another during the field period. Even if it was just by posting a 
short political message on a social network site. According to my analyses, media use, in 
particular political information media use, did contribute to an increase in these activities over 
time. The causal relationship between both factors runs partially through the development of 
internal efficacy (Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco, 2007), as pointed out earlier. This mechanism 
is also relevant when it comes to political participation in the classic sense: participation in the 
first general elections, which is a very important event in the process of political socialization 
(Sears & Valentino, 1997). 
Weighing the different forms of participation against each other, I find that media use 
is especially effective when it comes to a positive influence on online participation, like 
signing petitions or participating in online discussions about politics. Both findings are in line 
with and add to the body of literature with regard to political socialization of the young 
(Bakker & de Vreese, 2011; Lee, Shah, & McLeod, 2012; Quintelier & Vissers, 2008). 
According to the communication mediation model developed by McLeod, Shah and 
colleagues (McLeod, Shah, Hess, & Lee, 2010) the causal relationship between news media 
use and political participation is best understood as a mediated process in which talking about 
politics serves as a mediator between both. I suggest extending this notion and use the 
argument in broader perspective. In order to mobilize the young to develop political 
engagement, political information needs to be reflected upon, be it through political talk 
online or offline, or deliberation during attentive news use. It is important to note that this 
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process can be facilitated by adjusting political information content to be more relevant to a 
young audience. 
Reaching the tuned out generation 
So far I have argued that there are several ways in which media affect political 
socialization. In this dissertation I have demonstrated that particularly political information, 
provided it is relevant enough, can even mobilize those who generally have little interest in 
politics. However, there is one important condition for this process to work: young people 
need to be encouraged and need to decide to use political information; otherwise there will not 
be an effect. This is a point that has raised concerns among many. David Mindich‟s (2005) 
book about the tuned out generation is probably the most prominent publication dealing with 
the subject: young people do not follow the news anymore; they do not read newspapers and 
generally do not care about the political world. Although Mindich‟s bleak description of the 
young generation in America does not fit the Dutch case equally well – 4 out of 5 of the 
respondents in the panel report to watch the evening news at least once a week – there is also 
an undeniable lack of interest in politics in the Netherlands. Almost half of the participants in 
the panel report to have low interest in national politics, for international politics this number 
even increases to 62%. Yet, as I have pointed out earlier, involvement and attention are an 
important precondition for political information to have an effect on political engagement. 
This leads to an important puzzle that goes beyond this dissertation. How do we get the young 
to tune in the political debate in the first place? How can we get young people to care about 
politics just enough to start following the news? Arguably an important part of the solution to 
this puzzle has to be located outside the media.  
Political education in schools seems to be an obvious answer. Here programs that 
require active participation of students like debates or mock elections seem to be especially 
effective (McLeod et al., 2010). I would like to point to another possible strategy to solve this 
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problem. Given the positive effects of news use in the long run, stimulating media 
socialization to include more political information is likely to influence the process of 
political socialization in a positive way. This means political information would have to 
become an integral part of children‟s experience with media, even before they reach 
adolescence. 
Political engagement in the new millennium 
In the introduction of this dissertation I argued that our knowledge of political 
socialization needs to be updated as the advent of the Internet has changed the media as well 
as the political landscape profoundly. In the empirical studies presented in this dissertation it 
has become apparent that the Internet has indeed become an integral part of political 
socialization in the past years. Moreover, the Internet has not merely opened up new places to 
engage in politics; it has also had an impact on the causal mechanisms of political 
socialization itself.  
The reason is that engaging in politics and talking about politics online is often 
fundamentally different from talking about politics offline (Oser, Hooghe, & Marien, 2013). 
First, because communication itself is inherently different online and offline: online 
communication can by asynchronous in time, messages can potentially be stored forever, 
which means they can be read and re-read at a later point in time, and participants of online 
conversations have more time to create their messages, implying that they have more room to 
deliberate. Second, online platforms provide the opportunity to extend their social networks 
and talk to peers and adults one would not normally encounter in everyday life – including 
representatives of the political class. Finally, talking about politics online is blurring the 
border between communication and participation. Adolescents can, for example, post a link to 
an online petition and motivate others to sign on a social networking site.  
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All of these factors hold the potential to have a positive impact on political 
socialization (Coleman, 2008). As I have argued earlier, political information is much more 
likely to lead to a growth in political knowledge or engagement if it is reflected upon. The 
affordances of online communication naturally lead to deliberation about politics, provided 
the communication is about politics.  
Yet, there also is a downside. When the academic debate about online influence on 
political participation first started, the main concern of scholars was that using the Internet 
might take up a lot of time that would otherwise be spent on community activities (Kraut et 
al., 1998). Moreover, time spent online was seen to be time spent in social isolation and 
anonymity, which further decreases the feeling of belonging to a society in which one has an 
active role. Whereas the latter point is no longer in the focus of the academic debate, as social 
networking sites and other online services have changed the premises of the online 
experience, the time budget argument is still valid. The Internet is indeed a place offering an 
abundance of opportunities to engage in politics, but it also offers limitless opportunities to 
avoid politics altogether. So, in order to have a positive impact on the development of active 
citizenship the key problem is to get the conversation about politics started. Once young 
people become active online, there is a good chance they will develop an active attitude 
towards their citizenship. 
Limitations and implications for future research 
The process of political socialization is a complicated process starting at birth and 
continuing throughout our lives. Naturally, this dissertation cannot explain the role of the 
media throughout this entire process. This implies that many questions remain unanswered. 
Moreover, this dissertation is mainly based on one data source, namely a panel survey of four 
measurements over the course of two and a half years. While this is a rich data set allowing 
for elaborate testing of hypotheses, it is also constrained in several ways: it is limited to one 
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country at a specific period in time, there is a limited amount of concepts that could be 
measured, and the time span in between the measurements is relatively long. All of these 
constraints have implications on the generalizability of my results. 
The Netherlands is a mature democracy, also characterized by a relative high level of 
wealth and a well-functioning social system. All in all, it is an environment that provides 
plentiful opportunities to adolescents to learn, to join the workforce, and to engage in their 
private lives. All of these activities are also important steps adolescents need to take at this 
age that take up time and effort (Sigel & Hoskin, 1981). In other words, there is arguably less 
reason to go on the streets and call for a better future for themselves. This is just one of the 
possible system level variables that could affect the media‟s influence on political 
socialization. Others are the media system and the availability of (relevant to the young) 
political information in the media, the political system and to what it allows citizens to 
become involved during the electoral cycle, and the educational system (for example 
Quintelier & Hooghe, 2013). Therefore, in order to be confident that the findings in these 
studies also apply to other contexts future studies need to expand the geographical scope. It 
would be especially interesting to investigate difference between democratic and non-
democratic countries to find out to what degree the role of the media in political socialization 
depends upon the political context. 
Second, the length of the questionnaire used in the panel survey had to be limited to 
ensure that respondents would participate in the subsequent waves of the panel survey. That 
means that a number of key concepts could only be measured in a rather crude way. Parental 
influence, for example, is reduced to questions regarding the SES, educational and 
occupational background of the parents, their party preference, and whether or not they are 
subscribed to a newspaper. Variables that have proven to be of influence in the past, like the 
discussion culture at home (Chaffee, McLeod, & Atkin, 1971) could not be taken into 
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account. However, these variables are found to be of less relevance in recent studies in the 
field (Lee, Shah, McLeod, 2012). Moreover, although the questionnaire covered a 
considerable amount of questions regarding media use, our measures of exposure to media 
cannot fully do justice to the phenomenon. In the ever changing world of online news media 
(Trilling, 2013), we could only select a limited amount of news sources in the questionnaire, 
implying that the use of many blogs or websites relevant to the subject are not tapped. 
Additionally, as it becomes apparent from our data, Social Networking Sites are likely to 
cover political information from time to time which could also influence the process of 
political socialization through messages of peers. This is an especially interesting 
phenomenon, which certainly should be studied in depth in future research.  
The third constraint of my data is that it is limited in time and the number of 
measurements. As it became quite clear from the second empirical study presented in 
Chapters 2 and 3, media use already plays a role in the process of political socialization before 
the age of 15, and socialization does not stop once we turn out to vote for the first time. In this 
dissertation I could therefore only analyze a short, yet important, period of a continuous 
process. Developments I find might become stronger or weaker over time. The first empirical 
study of this dissertation certainly points in the direction that the media become even more 
important agent of socialization during young adulthood. More research is needed to unravel 
the effect of age on the process. For example, we do relatively little about the effect of 
seniority on media effects on political attitudes or participation.  
Collecting panel data among adolescents is challenging. On the one hand, 
developments take place really quickly and in order to get a good grasp of causal relationships 
it would be useful to have weekly data on the other hand, young respondents are easily bored 
and sensitized by questions in panel surveys. Having four measurements in two and a half 
years was a compromise between aiming to have a large enough sample at the end of the 
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survey and enough information about them in the meantime, but obviously it is not optimal. 
Therefore future research should do both, focus on short-term effects of causal mechanisms, 
preferably in the form of experiments and also expand the longitudinal scope of two years. 
Finally, my data is constrained by being quantitative survey data, which means there 
are questions I could answer and research questions that have to be left for other types of 
research. Qualitative interviews, for example, could provide insight in what motivates 
adolescents to participate or alienates them from politics. Observation of media use, 
especially in participatory online media, would help us to get a better picture of how 
adolescents use political information media today without having to rely on self-reports. 
Finally, this study on media effects relies solely on survey data thereby more or less 
neglecting the specifics of the content that is supposed to have an impact on political 
socialization. That means that I could ultimately only investigate half the picture. Adding 
content analysis data that describes in detail the characteristics of content adolescents have 
used, would allow matching cause and effect in a far more precise way, improve the 
modeling, and understand what drives the effects. This type of combined analysis of content 
and effects would allow us to address relevant questions like: Are specific subjects more 
likely to raise adolescent‟s knowledge about politics than others? Do certain frames mobilize 
or demobilize participation among the young? What is the effect of infotainment on the 
development of political knowledge and internal efficacy? Therefore, future research should 
combine content analysis, media use, and variables of political socialization to arrive at 
integrated models of political socialization. 
Concluding remarks 
If there is one thing to be learned from this dissertation, it is that media cannot do 
wonders to turn a disengaged youth around and to create a young citizenry that participates in 
democracy. Neither should the media be blamed for adolescent‟s apparent alienation from 
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politics. It‟s not the media‟s fault that young people feel disconnected or simply do not care 
about politics. If anything, the influence of media on political mobilization tends to be 
positive. The role of the media in the process of political socialization is to strengthen the 
foundation laid by parents and teachers and build forth on the attitudes and norms young 
people are picking up around them, ultimately taking adolescents into an upward spiral of 
political learning and engagement. 
The conclusion of a dissertation is meant to highlight the essence of the research presented, 
boiling it all down to a grand take home message. In this chapter I identified the key findings, 
discussed my results in the light of the societal and academic debate and suggested 
implications for policy, education and future research. Yet, to be honest, I actually do not 
know the essence of everything, because my research on these matters has only just started. 
Moreover, any essence or final conclusion could only be a snap shot as the next generation of 
adolescents is already growing up. Younger children today have never known a world without 
Twitter or Facebook and will use it even more naturally than the adolescents in the sample I 
analyzed for this dissertation. As they learn, buy, communicate, even live online, these 
children will engage in politics online as well – which will lead to a paradigm change in 
political socialization research. And I am curious to follow this development as a scientist and 
a citizen. 
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Appendix 
Table 3: Descriptives of the dependent and independent variables used in Chapter 2 
 14-20  34-40 
 Mean SD  Mean SD 
Political trust 4.95 .02  4.66 .007 
Party affiliation .34 .005  .55 .001 
Signed petition .22 .005  .25 .001 
Boycotted product .11 .003  .17 .001 
Age 17.83 .01  49, 90 .050 
Gender (1=female) .51 .006  0.50 .001 
Political interest 2.15 .009  2.56 .002 
Education  11.02 .024  12.72 .011 
Ideology  5.05 .02  5.144 .006 
News exposure 3.12 .022  5.03 .008 
Entertainment exp 5.76 .038  5.14 .009 
 
